Arms, Oil, and Chaos

Over the last few days, there has been a lot of commotion about the recent attacks on Saudi oil refineries, growing tensions between Iran and pretty much everyone else, and our efforts to address the problems.

During this, I have been occasionally digging up whatever I can to try to understand the situation and its overall potential impacts in the region as well as around the world. Some people have social lives, I get stuck with too many tabs open and a train of thought which is careening wildly through the digital landscape.

One such tab was open to a discussion with a friend and my casual interpretation of what I see happening and why:

On one hand you have our Secretary of State telling the Brits that they are responsible for their own tankers… on the other, we are sending troops to bolster Saudi air defenses…

We have been here before with Iran not too long ago… and yet here we are again.

If anything, I would say that this is a “probe/response” situation… not good in the short or long term because it establishes a pattern… and predictably is never a good thing in terms of tactical or strategic policy.

Over the years, I have become increasingly skeptical of the immediate reports which follow an attack or military action. Part of my doubt comes from developing a greater appreciation of how public opinion works as well as my reluctance to be emotionally reactive.

On the topic of our own recent history with Iran, however, I fully acknowledge the controversial ideas which accompany previous administrations. To go further on that topic would deviate from my initial point and the heart of the discussion as it turned towards our continued participation in NATO, our possible motivations, and the price and ability for self-defense:

“…UAE and Saudi Arabia, with all their wealth, doesn’t have the capability to protect their own infrastructure.”

I really have to resist the urge to look up the numbers, but from memory, those two countries import heavily from us as well as other nations for their own defenses.

However… one of the recurring themes I have had over the last few years is that technology does not and can not replace will to fight and responsible foreign policy. You can give the best tech to someone, but if they have no desire to fight the way that they need to/use what was given… then it is not just a waste, but a very precarious geopolitical situation later down the line.

The whole NATO thing… that is a point of contention for a lot of nations, but I sorta understand the issues: much of the onus for muscle has historically fallen to us because of our record of spending to deter the Soviets during the Cold War. The momentum slowed after ’91, but gradually went back up again after 9/11… making it a case of “well, they already have a huge military, so why should we break our banks?”

In regards to our involvement in the region… I dunno. My views might be wrong, piss someone off, or all of the above, but I take it as a bit more benevolent than most people realize. If we have shifted from importing oil to exporting oil, then pretty much any disruption in the ability for other oil-producing nations would have a greater effect on global markets than our own (initially). Sort of a “we got ours, but want to make sure you can get yours” angle… with the added aspect of we really don’t need Saudis’ economy to tank, creating even more instability in the region, and making a much bigger mess in the long term. Sooo… yeah… it makes a little bit of sense to me, but this is me rambling off the top of my head with no hard data to back up any of what I say.

It turned out that I was wrong in thinking that we have become completely independent of OPEC-provided oil. Our 2018 oil imports reached 9.93 million barrels per day and we exported 7.59 million barrels per day; overall, Saudi oil imports to the U.S. have been in rough decline since January 2019 – from 767,000 barrels per day to 570,000. My hunch was accurate, though: China’s growing demands for oil from Saudi Arabia have followed an erratic – yet positive – path since 2015, outpacing their domestic production capabilities.

“You know one thing I am wondering is how did the Saudis not pick up on the incoming drones? Are those not going to show up on a radar or air defense system of some sort? I ask this in all seriousness because I am ignorant on this and its something that’s been really gnawing at me the last few days.”

Valid question and one we won’t know the answers to for a while. Drones are relatively new developments in warfare… and their evolution is far from over. The radar cross section of the drones used, their flight profiles, the types and locations of the radar transmitters… yeah, if you are starting to think that detailed open discussions might be a bad thing, then you are right. On that same note, there is no telling what the Saudis knew prior to the actual explosions going off… and for the above reasons, they probably won’t say.

The topic of drones falls into the category of “posts considered but not yet written.” I have this strange theory that we are currently witnessing a significant shift in warfare due to the incorporation of drones for attacks just like the one being discussed and digital image capture devices like GoPro cameras for a quicker turnaround for after-action reviews by tactical commanders. Much like the application of submarines during the First World War, this technology is redefining elements of conflict much faster than effective countermeasures can be conceived.

“I hope you do write a blog post on this. I would be interested to read it. I would also be really interested to know more about Saudi and UAE defense spending and programs.”

I started opening tabs and got lost in the JPCOA and trying to understand how we got to this point with Iran, Saudi, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait. and every other nation in that region. France… I forgot France… AND Great Britain… Coming back to modern fiscal issues… I tend to pick some really messed up things to write about, and this is right up there. I’ll give it a shot over the next few days.

This part became more problematic than I thought. I know there are many different agencies tracking international arms trade: small arms survey, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); much like any collection of data, the results can vary.

From SIPRI’s report covering the period from 2014 to 2018, the U.S. ranked in first place of the 25 largest arms exporters in the world, providing 36% of all major weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and associated systems. This was slightly more than the next three nations on the list – Russia, France, and Germany – combined (at a total of 34.2%) and with Saudi Arabia and UAE being the largest and third-largest recipients at 22% and 6.7%, respectively. Interestingly, the same table also shows UAE exporting arms to Egypt (41%), Jordan (10%), and Yemen (7.6%).

When discussing arms trade, it is important to make the distinction between “small arms/light weapons” (man-portable weapons like pistols, rifles, and light-to medium machine guns) versus “major conventional arms” like vehicles, aircraft, ships, and land-based offensive/defensive weapons and/or sensor systems. However, the exact details often overlook systems like radars or other early-warning devices…and, the receiving nation doesn’t always report exactly what was transferred…

“We arm rebels or countries and eventually those arms are killing our own people.”

It is a nightmare in reading about how arms flow throughout the world… but it is also pretty fascinating at the same time. I like chaos, and arms trade is allllll sorts of chaotic.

I realized the truth of how chaotic doing arms trade research… unfunded and casual research, at that… actually can be. Tracking the application of those weapons, once sold, is often a frustrating exercise in futility. Every once in a while, folks more bored than I will compile articles based upon their own detailed research. For me, I’m not there yet and probably won’t get to that level of scrutiny. Readers get bored, life goes on…

“I am just ready for our military to be given a reprieve. You know from experience what this 18-year conflict has cost us, and I hate for us to extend this any longer.”

Yep… the costs have been higher than anyone expected. However… I am conflicted: there is no way that I will ever return to service (ok, there is always an outside chance, but if things get THAT bad, then… yeah… ), so it is hard for me to say that I honestly don’t see an end to our involvement in the region. Look at how things deteriorated in Iraq after we left; I’m pretty sure that is a determining factor in looking to end things in Afghanistan.

It sucks – we have sons and daughters who are going to be adults sooner than we realize, and the role models that we have been may lead them to serving… (don’t hyperventilate at that idea). HOWEVER… being the vicious optimist, I can only hope that they learn and break the cycles where we haven’t… I have faith that they’ll be ok.

This is the crux of the discussion: what it means not for us, but for our kids. While peace in the Middle East is more improbable than plausible, I can only hope that we give them the curiosity, tools, and motivation to learn, implement, and mitigate the patterns that humanity follows.

Postscript:

This post started from a discussion between two folks who are fairly distant on the political spectrum on some issues, but more concerned about what this means for us as a nation. This isn’t the first time a comment has led to a much longer blog, nor will it be the last time; most importantly, though, I want to highlight that the divide can only be healed by folks taking the time to actually communicate with each other… that there is much more than what is reported… and that there are people out there thinking, listening, and writing (1746 words? Damn).