Successes and Failures of the Korean War

If you had to choose one topic for each, what would you identify as the most successful U.S. effort and the biggest failure of the U.S. effort in the Korean War? By “effort,” consider a battle; a strategy; an example of great heroism or great failure; a branch of the service; etc. Explain your choices.

The most successful U.S. effort during the Korean War was the progressively extensive utilization of airpower, namely jet aircraft and medical evacuation as a force multiplier for ground efforts. Despite initial reports of North Korean superiority regarding combat aircraft, and initial effectiveness of anti-aircraft weaponry used against the U.N. air forces, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) was still able to provide the mobility and force projection necessary to prevent a quick North Korean victory during the war.[1] Air power provided direct and logistical support to ground forces with the ancillary benefit of providing a bolstering effect on morale for the ground troops.[2] Assistance to beleaguered ground assaults, such as the exploits of Task Force Smith during the opening defensive operations, targeted resupply convoys constrained to the limited infrastructure within the mountainous regions. Supporting Task Force Smith, the Air Force was able to destroy 117 trucks in addition to the 38 tanks and 7 half-tracks, establishing a considerable threat to North Korean ground logistics.[3] Finally, the development of medical evacuation doctrine in the form of forward medical units or facilities and ships relatively close to the battlefields provided a blueprint for subsequent efforts to be further refined in later wars.[4]

Alternatively, the biggest failures of the U.S. during the Korean War, involved airpower. The redeployment of the FEAF to Europe prior to 1950 possibly played a key role in creating conditions which were favorable to the invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces.[5] Similarly, the strategic planners in South Korea did not appreciate the intelligence supporting the fact that North Korean forces enjoyed a regional superiority which placed the South Korean defenders at a severe tactical and strategic disadvantage.[6] The lack of prepared facilities and locations which could support fighters and cargo aircraft hampered both defensive and offensive operations and planning within the region.[7] Owing to a regimented and inflexible attitude towards warfare which selectively relied on perspectives and experiences of the Second World War, photographic reconnaissance aircraft were sparse and those present provided limited intelligence support to battlefield commanders.[8] Finally, this lack of foresight also found close air support being provided by liquid-cooled F-51 fighters, as opposed to the venerable P-47’s which, with their radial, air-cooled engines, had established themselves as successful support aircraft to the ground units in Europe during the Second World War.[9]

As we look at the battle…  was there any positives at all the allies gleaned from this battle other than the temporary control of it? Was there any review and/or blame assigned for such a foolish waste of lives post-war?

As far as the possible “lessons learned” from earlier battles such as Chochi’won, the biggest lessons learned by the U.S. forces were those indicating how atrociously unprepared they were for the fight against North Korea and how understandably reluctant the West was in addressing the role of Chinese involvement in the war. The demobilization of ground troops following the Second World War was a contentious issue for military and civilian leadership, and the slow-down in 1946 resulted in an increased involvement of the Communist Party of the United States in their attempts to take political advantage of the discord.[10] Aside from the political repercussions, the demobilization immediately following the war presented problems in readiness. Of the four divisions remaining in Japan as occupation forces, three were insufficiently manned for their authorized peacetime strengths, the Army War College remained closed until 1950, and the operational, research, and development needed of the Department of Defense suffered as budgetary restraints prevented the effective training and procurement of men and equipment during the postwar years.[11]

In regards to the “review and/or blame” for the debacle which Task Force Smith has become to be known as, much like every battle in human history, there has been plenty of opportunity for a critique of the actions and decisions of the past. One of which, “Task Force Smith, The Lesson Never Learned” by John Garrett, has been subsequently added to my growing digital library. The Battle of Chochi’won was selected mostly out of personal interest in the obscure, but the topic of the failures and successes of TF Smith have been largely covered and analyzed as an example of the historic problems found in poor planning and execution based on ineffective doctrine and policy.[12]

[The issue of hypotheticals in the war was brought up by one of the students.]

One of the trickier parts of studying history is the idea of “what if” and other speculative efforts. Much like the First and Second World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War of the early 1990s, future history students will be looking at our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq wondering why we didn’t see things as clearly as they do with the benefit of their hindsight.

In terms of the use of air support during the Korean War, working within the established rules of engagement was simply their best way of preventing a further escalation of the conflict. There are many variables which could have been different – from letting MacArthur use atomic/nuclear weapons, to chasing the Communist forces into China, to even preventing the entire conflict from becoming a larger issue with just a little more diplomatic recognition of Korea before the Second World War.

As it stands, though, the Korean War taught the U.S. that international efforts through the U.N. indirectly suggested a certain restriction in warfare due to the cooperative agreements and rules under that organization. This is a tricky position to maintain in larger conflicts, as it can generate frustration and hamper the effectiveness of the strongest partner to accommodate the more… diplomatic… members of the aggregate. The old saying of a camel being “a race horse designed by committee” would apply in this sense – Korea was a conflict managed by committee.

[I can only guess that the conversation turned to the containment of ideology and a comparison between the Korean War and the Global War on Terror…]

Your last sentence was very interesting, and it made me laugh as I re-read your entire post, substituting “Korea” with either “Afghanistan,” “Iraq,” or “Syria.” Not a funny “ha-ha” laugh, but more of a “ha-ha… oh…” laugh. A look at current policy over the last decade has many references to the ideas of “containment” (Islamic fundamentalists/extremists), and “intelligence/policy failures” in these regions.

While the current conflict in the Middle East is not exactly the same as the Korean War, much could be said about the similarities of our present DoD procurement process and the warning given by President Eisenhower when he warned about the “acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”[13] With much of the press critical of programs like the Air Force’s F-35, the Navy’s Virgina-class submarines, and the Army’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the requested budgetary support for these programs ($10,504.5, $5,322.3, and $735.4 billion, respectively) are in direct competition with other operational DoD needs as well as the plethora of other budgetary considerations for the present fiscal year.[14]

Returning to the comparison with the Korean War, the failures and successes you highlighted were part of the larger problem of the post-Second World War economy in the U.S. and the efforts to control the continued costs of the armed forces at the expense of readiness and intelligence. We finished the Second World War as one of the best armed forces in the world, yet we grew both complacent in our abilities and neglectful of the growing threat of Communism. While our airpower sustained much of the fighting in Korea, many of the aircraft were remnants of the Second World War and many of our ground forces had suffered due to the excessive budgetary cuts and re-appropriation of funds. In this sense, history does in fact seem to be cyclic.

It is always interesting to see modern applications of historic weapons systems – a good example of this would be the current use of Mosin Nagants in places like Syria. However, as much as I am a fan of old Soviet technology, the idea of facing a T-34 in combat is something I would have to pass on.

As far as the air war went, though, F-51’s being pitted against jets as well as being relegated to ground support missions was something that I never really understood, in terms of the logic of the practice. Radial engines were entirely more robust and resistant to damage, as opposed to the liquid-cooled engines of the Mustangs. Why P-47’s were not used during the Korean War is beyond me, but I suppose you go to war with the gear you have, and not the gear you wished you had.

Could you imagine how Americans would feel if Washington D.C. was taken over?

I’m sorry – I couldn’t stop laughing at that idea and the thought processes which followed. J

In all seriousness, I picked the Battle of Moscow in late 1941 as a topic for a paper in an earlier class, and I would have to agree with you about the role of capitols when it comes to warfare. The defense of Moscow was intense, and as much as I find the idea of a foreign invader posed to take D.C. (again), I would have to agree with the idea that the fight for D.C. would be vicious and surprisingly unifying. Hopefully, we will never see how that would pan out.

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[1] Bong K. Lee, Unfinished War – Korea, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2007), accessed March 2, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central, 68, 86.

[2] Ibid., 80.

[3] Ibid., 106.

[4] Lester H. Brune, Korean War, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1996) accessed March 2, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central, 220.

[5] Ibid., 42.

[6] Ibid., 44.

[7] Ibid., 66.

[8] Ibid., 114.

[9] Ibid., 173.

[10] John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, DA PAM 20-210, (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1952), accessed March 4, 2017, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-8/CMH_Pub_104-8.pdf, 161, 167.

[11] Garry L. Thompson, “Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing.” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 34, 36.

[12] John Garrett, Task Force Smith, The Lesson Never Learned, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), accessed March 4, 2017, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA381834, ii.

[13] “Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1960-61 : Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1, 1960, to January 20, 1961,” quod.lib.umich.edu, 2005, accessed March 4, 2017, .https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4728424.1960.001/1090?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image.

[14] United States Department of Defense, “FY 2017 Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System,” comptroller.defense.gov, 2016, accessed March 4, 2017, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Weapons.pdf, 6-7.