Classical Clausewitzian Strategy, COIN, and Shock & Awe

Study the Second Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan. How did Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deviate from a classical Clausewitzian strategy? Do you believe this deviation caused many of the difficulties faced by Coalition Forces in the years that followed? How has the Petraeus Doctrine addressed the problems of modern insurgencies?

It is important to first clarify the ideas of “classical Clausewitzian strategy” before continuing further with an accurate analysis. Clausewitz is quite clear at the difference between tactics and strategy – the former is the “use of armed forces in the engagement,” while the latter consists of “the use of engagements for the object of war.”[1] In neither Afghanistan nor in Iraq was an actual state of war declared by the United States Congress as was the case, 11 times prior.[2] Rather, a “Global War on Terror” has provided the official sanction for American military power to be utilized against both Afghanistan and Iraq. This created a situation not entirely unique in that similar resolutions have authorized the use of force against North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Libya, and various nations in the Middle East. While it is easy to grasp at the aspects of Clausewitz most convenient to an argument in support of such interventions, the issue of deviations which result from Clausewitz’s theory not perfectly matching the problems presented by force against both countries opens the opportunity for causality – one “solution” creates a separate and seemingly unrelated problem, of which none are found in any formal “rule book.”

Clausewitz is quite specific, again, that “military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life and the two cannot be separated,”[3] yet over the last decade and a half since the attacks of September 11^th, numerous victories have been publicly declared every time a “person of interest” of “key leader” has been negated. The failures of the Petraeus Doctrine in addressing the problem of modern insurgencies returns yet again to the overall failure to completely grasp the matters of his ideas of “critical analysis.” Of the three “intellectual activities” required by Clausewitz during such a vital function if warfare, none of them could have been considered to be completed without bias or prejudice. The “discovery and interpretation of equivocal facts” for the initiation of offensive force against Afghanistan, like Iraq, was tainted by the rage and anger of the 2001 attacks. In Afghanistan, leader after leader – to include the key figures in plotting the attacks – were neutralized, yet there is no clear end in sight. The invasion of Iraq is still contended as a necessity based on the claims of “weapons of mass destruction,” and though victory was declared before the insidious specter of progressively more frequent and capable insurgent attacks necessitated a surge, victory was once again announced – only to find a more capable enemy overwhelming the same Iraqi forces diligently trained and thoroughly equipped by the United States. American intelligence efforts also failed in their “tracing effects back to their causes,” as the recruitment of radical elements in the region showed no sign of diminishing, despite American efforts to “win hearts and minds” of the populace in both nations. Finally, the “investigation and evaluation of the means employed”[4] proved to be an expensive reactionary exercise as the lethality and employment of anti-Coalition methods perversely resembled more of an insurgent adherence to Clausewitztian definition of both tactics and strategy than our own doctrinal attempts of prediction and engagement. In the end, a library of books does nothing for the person who does not read before acting, while action with the freedom of convention and academic justification seems to have been oddly more effective.

“Can you describe in greater detail what the Petraeus Doctrine consist of and how it deviated from earlier counterinsurgency doctrines?”

Despite being past the deadline (a wedding took up way more time than planned), I feel that this is a very good question, and warrants my best answer.

Over the last few years, I have become increasingly skeptical of publications such as The Atlantic, however, their definition of the Petraeus Doctrine denotes the doctrinal shift of the Army into “era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.”[5] In a way, there is not much of a deviation of the past, which is my biggest issue with the whole concept of any “pivot” or “shift” in policy or training. Cornerstone of the Petraeus Doctrine is FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 of 2014, simply titled Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. Thirteen chapters and a total of 202 pages (PDF) of a theory which fundamentally may seem sound, but in practice is often hindered by the same bureaucracy which promoted it – the Department of Defense (DoD).

In the beginning of the introduction, the previous DoD experiences with counterinsurgency (COIN) has been a continual process where the previous version of the manual, published in 2006, “filled and important doctrinal gap at a time when U.S. forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations.”[6] I have skimmed through both, and while the changes between the two denote a marked improvement of the approach to such a difficult type of warfare, there are still issues which I see as basic stumbling blocks. Going back to the “intelligence fundamentals,” the emphasis on culture, cultural intelligence, and the “mindset of a local population,” it would appear that the lessons learned from either the start of the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq seem to muddle this step every 9-12 months, when it comes time to transition one unit out of theater with only a brief overlap with their replacements. Culture is not a mere “check the block” part of a “local area orientation” and progress cannot be made with new faces re-establishing trust on such a short timeline. This would naturally lead to a certain level of “transience” of U.S. efforts to effectively counter insurgencies, and lends to a game of patience on the part of those who seek to undermine and destroy such a level of functional trust between tribal leaders and Western forces.

Has the Petraeus Doctrine changed from previous counterinsurgency doctrines? I really don’t think there has been much of a change at all, considering that the Petraeus Doctrine first came out over 12 years ago and we still seem to have troops in both locations with no clear end game in mind.

“Shock and awe seems like it would be a better strategy to get rid of a coup and restore a friendlier ruler to power. What do you think?”

It is difficult to be married to a Russian woman, sometimes. My wife seems to have this odd (for a classical pianist) knowledge of some very interesting characters from Russian history, and one of them – General Mikhail Skobelev – is famous for his 1881 quote, which I find appropriate for your answer: “I hold it as a principle that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they remain quiet.”[7]

“Shock and awe” is only effective if one’s intent is only to surprise and amaze an opponent, in my opinion. Such an approach may have worked well in 1991 against Iraq, when the idea of a modern protracted aerial bombardment before any land operations truly did “shock and awe.” However, anyone with a pulse and an internet connection can see that air supremacy alone cannot dictate a war, nor does the presence of a technologically advanced ground force.

To “get rid of a coup,” just like dealing with extremists, one has to look beyond the symptoms and search for the root causes to address the issue there. For example, say we have “nation Z,” and they have historically been corrupt and fickle in their relations towards the UN. “Nation Z” previously was ruled by a very pro-western monarch, and nation Z was developing… slowly, but developing nonetheless. If “nation Z” has a coup supported by power-hungry military leadership, wouldn’t seem logical that there would immediately arise another “potential” form of leadership within the military which promises better relations with the UN – “if only they would help get rid of the current coup, and put them in charge”? The fundamental problem is corruption, not the convenience, really. How does one take the right course through such a political and potentially military minefield? If the cause is addressed, then the symptoms eventually disappear, right?

I think that there is never really a “best answer” and that “shock and awe” only looks good in motivational montages… but, if one is truly going to hit an enemy, they need to do so as hard as they can…

Notes:

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128.

[2] “U.S. Senate: Official Declarations of War by Congress,” Senate.Gov, 2016, accessed November 18, 2016, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm.

[3] Clausewitz, 137.

[4] Clausewitz, 156.

[5] Andrew Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” The Atlantic, 2008, accessed November 22, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/10/the-petraeus-doctrine/306964/.

[6] U.S. Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014), vii.

[7] Colin S. Gray, “Clausewitz, History, and the Future Strategic World,” in The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession, ed. Williamson Murray, and Richard Hart Sinnreich (Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press, 2006), accessed November 21, 2016, ProQuest ebrary, 115.