The Treaty of Versailles, Fourteen Points and Retribution

The Treaty of Versailles ended World War I but it proved a poor ending. Have you looked at the actual document? Why might it and the war’s ending have led to World War II?

Until my academic adventures, I had only a casual familiarity with the actual Treaty of Versailles in its lengthy 1919 entirety. Browsing the various Articles my initial reaction is one of confusion: the “Covenant of the League of Nations” as the preamble establishes a clear “us versus them” feel and, in hindsight, obviously sets the tone of the alienation of any nation not officially incorporated into the League of Nations – specifically, Germany.

Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech in the beginning of 1918 established the entry of the United States into the First World War as a matter of “violations of right,” and alluded to the fact “program of the world’s peace” was the one he proposed and “the only possible program.” Although this speech proved to be only the foundation of the capitulation of Germany later that year,[1] the subsequent wording of it and the Treaty of Versailles created the conditions which provided the political unrest in Germany to gather momentum leading to the later formation of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party.

The League of Nations at the time of the First Assembly in Geneva at the end of 1920 included many countries across the globe with the exception of noteworthy members of the Central Powers: Germany, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey.[2] With the financial burden of repatriations described under Articles 231 through 247, Germany was destined to fail from the beginning of the conditions set forth by the Treaty as they proved to be unable to provide for their own citizens in addition to such financial, agricultural, and material obligations dictated by the League of Nations.[3] Unlike the United States, which not only avoided war on its soil but had economically benefitted from the war and provided much of the world’s credit,[4] Germany became a petri dish of angst and frustration which saw the progressively increasing number and influence of “military associations” of veterans which gained more political power as Germany failed to be able to meet external and internal obligations.[5]

“One would think that having this precedent, the US, though not signers of the treaty, would have learned from historical mistakes and learned to be inclusive following the ending of hostilities…”

Before I retired, I used to joke that there are several over-used phrases in the Army – one of which was “you would think…” As I have gotten older (and farther along in my academic career) I find this phrase painful and frustrating in that it applies to more than an arm of the Department of Defense. In the case of history, we have the luxury of making that correlation about events in the past, but the possible ramifications of our actions today often are vague and contested by either experience, ego, or opinion… or all of the above. In the case of the Versailles Treaty, perhaps these motivations were also topped with that one emotion which can readily transcend logic, restraint, and clarity: revenge. Please don’t misconstrue my meaning: I agree with the idea that the Treaty was “junk diplomacy” and lead to what some people study and others trivialize in bad attempts at “historically based” entertainment. However, the creation of a monster such as Nazi Germany takes much more than one Treaty… even if that one factor was a prime mover in a series of smaller pieces of the puzzle. As much as I despise excessive ponderings of “what if,” it would be interesting to dwell upon what would happen during the years after the First World War without the Treaty of Versailles or the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

“What do you think of the ‘Fourteen Points?’ Would this have been the basis for a lasting peace?”

I personally think that the idea of a “lasting peace” of any sorts is a fanciful stretch of optimism when it comes to societies, and even more of a stretch when it comes to the close of the First World War. Germany’s national pride was tarnished beyond repair, France and Belgium absolutely needed a target for the blame of the loss of life and resources they endured, and very few countries were even remotely prepared for the aftermath of the war in terms of the care for veterans and the undercurrents of angst the war had imparted on their populations. Wilson’s approach to peace, in my opinion, only solidified those feelings with almost a lofty snobbishness as the United States really did not suffer nearly as much as any of the other participants of the war. Our late entry and economic benefits regarding the First World War really did not put us in a position to “fairly” insist on the demands for peace as much as those nations who were engaged in the fighting from the beginning.

If things had gone differently – a significant level of direct involvement from the start of hostilities, or another nations’ primary role in pressing for peace – the resolution of the war and the management of the peace afterwards would more than likely have diverged from the path which led to the Second World War, but in reality, Europe’s diversity in politics, population, and prerogatives would have inevitably led to different wars, as was the case in Europe’s pre-1914 history.

“…A vengeful and retributive act…”

Yes, indeed… The Treaty of Versailles rang true of both cases. In reading the thoughts of other classmates, it would seem to be an accurate assessment that our current perspective is one of mutual confusion as to how such a treaty could be drafted without the slightest idea of what these conditions would imply for Germany.

It would be hard to determine the best way for the First World War to end, politically, to prevent the Second World War from happening. The plain truth of the matter is that Germany was viewed as the primary instigator in the conflict, regardless of Austria-Hungary’s role, and perhaps it was this lopsided blame which greatly assisted the resentment of the conditions and obligations placed on Germany which made the rise of someone like Hitler “make sense” to the average German in the two decades between the wars.

I can only hope that future policy makers are chosen not for their extensive and impressive law degrees, but for their understanding and study of history and how to avoid repeating the same mistakes over and over again.

“I believe this war was very much viewed as an “us versus them” standpoint as the world had never seen alliances of such magnitude before and therefore didn’t quite know how to react when the dust settled, do you agree?”

In sitting here and pondering the question, I have to force myself to consider the perspective of each nation involved – their loss of life, the frustrated efforts of diplomacy, and the nightmare of the rebuilding process – for some. In terms of Germany, most simply put, they lost a war that they were essentially dragged into due to their choices of alliances. It was not an entirely unwilling level of coercion, mind you, but they were assigned most of the blame and responsibility. France and Belgium lost men and territory, and Britain lost men and national prestige. With the relatively limited involvement of the U.S. in the direct fighting and disproportionate political influence at the close of the war, it is easy to understand the confusion as to who was most capable and responsible in setting the terms of the peace and the subsequent enforcement of the Treaty. Therefore, the confusion afterwards only makes sense.

“With the assassination of the Archduke, it set off a wave of promises made that had disastrous consequences and I can’t help but think that if it were handled at the lowest level possible, could it have been prevented?”

Handling things at the lowest level of involvement is always a great idea – from small unit administrative issues to municipal issues between local governments. In this case, however, there were too many “fingers in the pie/chefs in the kitchen” for low-level negotiations to truly be effective. Were there to be negotiations between Germany and Belgium, Germany and France, etc., the possibility for accusations of unfairness and duplicity from other nations would have complicated any agreements to the point of rendering further attempts futile or redundant. As bad as things turned out, the Treaty of Versailles was pretty much the only way for everyone to be on the same page, even if the book was poorly written…

“I firmly believe that WWII was a direct consequence of the failures in the aftermath of the Great war, do you agree?”

It is hard to say whether or not the Second World War would have occurred if the post First World War policies in different nations was different. I firmly believe that the failures to enforce parts of the Treaty of Versailles and other militarily-limiting legislation enabled nations like Germany and Japan to further disregard any similar restrictions even further (much like the old saying “every time you lower a standard, you set a new one”). By the time nations like Britain and the U.S. attempted to enforce ideas like the Kellogg-Briand Pact,[6] the only true accomplishment of “controls” such as this was to limit the military of those who abided by it – the U.S. and Britain, primarily. Like the current argument for gun control, the law is only followed by those who are law-abiding.

Mike

[1] Michael Duffy, “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ Speech, 8 January 1918,” firstworldwar.com, 2009, accessed on December 26, 2016, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/fourteenpoints.htm.

[2] “First Ordinary Session of the Assembly,” indiana.edu, 2002, accessed December 27, 2016, http://www.indiana.edu/~league/1thordinaryassemb.htm.

[3] Michael Duffy, “Treaty of Versailles: Articles 231-247 and Annexes,” firstworldwar.com, 2009, accessed on December 26, 2016, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles231-247.htm.

[4] John Cooper, Pivotal Decades – The United States, 1900-1920, (New York: W. W. Norton: 1990), 319.

[5] Roger Chickering, and Stig Forster, Publications of the German Historical Institute: The Shadows of Total War : Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939 (New York, US: Cambridge University Press, 2003), accessed December 26, 2016, ProQuest ebrary, 106.

[6] “Between the World Wars, 1919–1939 – Arms Control and Disarmament,” Americanforeignrelations.com, 2017, accessed January 1, 2017, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Arms-Control-and-Disarmament-Between-the-world-wars-1919-1939.html.