Props, Training, and Logistics

Resistance to write ad nauseum about my speculations on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is due to my own biases on who is more wrong than the other; in all honesty, it is simply because we are too close to the datum point of yesterday. We don’t know what we haven’t verified as known in both the subjective and objective reality beyond Twitter and the politically fickle media, and this creates problems for those of us who understand and relish the lessons of history.

Much of what I choose to write on the subject of contemporary conflict today is, as a result, speculative. I could use the limited time afforded to find rabbit hole upon rabbit hole of .gov and .org websites to buttress any definitive points made, but in doing so, I would compress that available time to write my thoughts to the point where the final result would be frantic and disjointed… and thus disappointing in failing to meet my own nebulous standards.

Yet here I am… trying…

One of the recurring themes on my mind lately have reached an apex with some of the pictures out of the Black Sea of the ship previously floating known as the Moskva. Again, I offer no proof – just speculation – but I cannot shake the question of the actual combat readiness of the warship against the purported capabilities highlighted by Western and Russian media outlets.

Before I continue, I want to highlight those last few words: “…purported capabilities highlighted by Western and Russian media outlets.” I smile as I type this as the quote previously used from Treebeard comes to mind:

Side? I am on nobody’s side, because nobody is on my side…

The media on all sides have a stake in this conflict – it generates a disconcerting level of paranoia and fear, which easily overrule rationality and logic. In exciting these primal and reactionary responses, any faltering ad revenues due to distrust and disgust might be regained; at the same time, any political biases held by the editorial and financial powers-that-be could be subtly leveraged into further machinations of public opinion in one desired direction or another. Call me caustically cynical, but I have zero faith that much of what is passed as “factual news” is neither based in fact nor is news. My trust in journalistic ethics is below my trust in teenage procrastination, gas station sushi, and plums… in that order.

Back to my thoughts on the Moskva. Remember the Kuznetsov – that other flagship of the Russian Navy? No? The falling crane/sinking drydock incident back in 2018 which killed two and delayed repairs on the carrier for a few more years isn’t really exactly reassuring in terms of the organizational competence associated with the word “flagship.” Though this isn’t the smoking gun of evidence-based damnation, it is hardly indicative of the money necessary to devote towards the staffing, training, and lifecycle costs of the most visible representative of a nation’s naval might.

Of course, we haven’t had the best of luck with our own ships: the loss of the USS Bon Homme Richard, the USS Miami, and near losses of the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald compels me to be as fair as possible in considering the ancillary factors which come into play (even though the first two of those four examples exist as criminal human malevolence and not misjudgment).

Even more sinister of a consideration is the fact that what is being said might not be what has occurred. The Moskva was a Slava-class guided missile cruiser – one of ten planned of the class, and one of three completed. Interestingly, the Ukrayina – what would have been the fourth Slava – ­has been moored in Mykolaiv, Ukraine for nearly four decades… unfinished and unscrappable… much like so many more once-viable relics of the Cold War which can be found littering former Soviet airfields and installations. What an interesting method of disposing old tanks, aircraft, and ships: to “season” a war of digital influence with the spice of obsolescent equipment burning. After all, the average person wouldn’t be able to discern the differences between a T-55 and a T-90… or a MiG-23 with a Su-33… or a Ukrainian from a Russian… and that, unfortunately, doesn’t matter much when the destruction and gore from the media of choice elicits and reinforces the reactions the headlines suggest.

I have questions about the loss of the Moskva…

Wouldn’t the detonation of propellant and/or warheads of the various surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles create substantially more damage to the ship than was photographed?

A handful of crappy images are all that’s out there?

In the pictures that are available, the seas look oddly tranquil for a storm which sank the stricken vessel after the attack (granted, it could have been the proverbial “calm before the storm,” but I have reservations…)

And, of course… This… this is the “feared naval peer adversary” we have been worried about – one which could have their flagship nixed from buoyancy by a couple of shore-based anti-ship missiles? With no known countermeasures launched or employed?

Quite odd.

My questions have been increasing exponentially over the last few years about a lot of things which would probably just be easier to believe than dispute… However, that wouldn’t be my particular path; never has been, and never will be.

Logistics is another aspect of interest in this conflict which Dave rekindled with an earlier share of a fascinating article: Ukraine War Is Depleting America’s Arsenal of Democracy. Late last year, when the new round of sanctions created a sudden rush on Russian-manufactured centerfire ammunition, I joked to my son that if someone really wanted to strain/frustrate the Russian ammunition manufacturers, all that was needed was to significantly drop the price of imported ammunition – devaluing it and increasing demand all at the same time.

Interestingly, the same could be said about the assistance via small arms and equipment to Ukraine: that the sudden imperative to send man-portable anti-tank/air defense systems overseas might be placing a similar strain on Western production capacity and ability. After all, where do these systems and munitions come from? How much “excess” is actual excess when national defense becomes a critical factor?

One of the lessons learned from previous conflicts is that what is planned to be enough is usually overly optimistic. Mission dictates the individual or unit load, but the ability for consistent resupply dictates the battle and drives the subsequent battles; second, third, and fourth orders of effect and consequences, really. One might strive to pack light, but the changing situation necessitates a static position for extended periods of time… while over preparation and equipping prevents the facility of movement and thus constrain lateral options.

On a global scale, domestic production of the munitions and the logistics which shape any and every conflict, creates options and forges supporting alliances. Conversely, the supplying of foreign conflicts in proxy wars never works out well for anyone in the long run, but the depletion of the instruments – and production capacity – is effectively the death knell of a nation engaged in such endeavors. One can supply rocks to the enemy of my enemy… but eventually, those rocks will become scarce… and the enemy of my enemy suddenly becomes my enemy as well when alliances inevitably shift against the provocateur. Not “if,” but “when.”

Interesting times… and only time will tell if some of us were truly “borderline tin hat aficionados” or “folks who guessed wisely.” For me, I seriously hope that I can laugh at these in the future while I expand my foil tricorne collection… for the alternative is chilling and undesirable.