(From Part Two)
How well did the war go for Austria-Hungary in the first two years, 1914-1915?
Overall, Austria-Hungary fared relatively well against the French, who were primarily focused on defending against the Germans[1] and Italians at the beginning of the war.[2] However, their armies struggled against the Russian forces who enjoyed superiority in numbers and equipment[3] and the determined resistance of the Serbs.[4]
How widespread was Russian support for war?
Initially, though the call to duty was unpopular, 96% of those summoned for service in the Russian army reported,[5] and the threat of revolt against the Tsar was replaced by urban patriotism despite the fact that the efforts for funding and supplying the Russian army was depriving the agricultural areas with their ability to harvest, thus leading to riots.[6]
What was actually good about trench warfare?
The development of medical treatment, supplies, and vaccinations all were results of trench warfare which served as one of the few benefits of trench warfare. Another advantage of trench warfare was that it served an effective purpose in protecting the soldiers from the dangers posed by improved artillery fire and the new machineguns developed during the war.[7]
How did airplanes change fighting initially?
Aircraft provided the ability for commanders and planners to have assets which could directly observe the battlefield.[8]
What weapon helped the French hold off the Germans at the Marne in 1914? (why was it so affective?)
The 75mm field gun was effectively used by the French to support the infantry by firing from carefully selected positions and by using either delayed fuses or specially designed anti-personnel shells, allowed French troops to hold their positions against the Germans.[9]
How did contemporaneous German weapons of the era compare French?
The French submarine force was the strongest of all the navies,[10] and it was the French who urged the creation of tanks as a sort of mobile and armored artillery platform.[11]
How did the new style of warfare and communications change the roles of generals?
The changes in warfare during the First World War brought forth the need for generals to place more trust in the abilities of their subordinates due to the fact that communication abilities had been greatly outpaced by the size and maneuverability of the armies. [12]
What sort of miscalculations did the Germans make at Verdun in 1916?
Germany failed to appreciate the lengths French leadership would go to maintain control of Verdun. What the Germans saw as an opportunity for a breakthrough turned into a stagnant conflict which stalled the momentum of the attacking forces and allowed the French forces to regroup and British forces to augment the defenses.[13]
How was the British strategy at the Somme a compromise?
The British committed more artillery than infantry, which caused more German casualties for very little of the battlefield to be occupied by the British.[14]
What were the British and Germans’ respective naval strategies in the North Sea?
The British sought to restrict the German navy’s operations to the North Sea and attempt to draw the German fleet into a decisive battle. Contrary to this, the German approach to maritime warfare was that of attrition – to engage the superior Royal Navy through smaller engagements, thereby creating a strategic equilibrium.[15]
How did the [naval] blockade impact Germany?
Since the British blockade prevented German warships from being able to operate in any direct and decisive manner against the Royal Navy, German leadership stressed a shift in focus to the Baltics and the use of submarines as opposed to capital ships.[16]
What factors blocked constructive diplomacy in this phase of the war?
The ideas that Britain was more susceptible to economic stress, Germany’s dependence on imports, and the overall strain on both economies prevented Germany and Britain from effective attempts at diplomacy.[17]
What sort of challenges faced the allied governments by 1917?
The beginning of American involvement in the war, internal political pressures of France and Britain towards the war,[18] and the Russian withdrawal from the Eastern Front due to the 1917 Revolution and the capitulation of the Tsar by the Bolsheviks[19] posed the biggest challenges to the allied governments that year.
“While these leaders suffered somewhat of the same danger when they were located close to the front, they did have a first-hand view of what their soldiers were facing. By removing them from the front, they would soon lose sight of the morale and health issues which affected the common line soldier.”
The idea of “leading from the front” is always going to be a contentious argument in advocacy for such practice and rationale as to why this falls under the category of “bad idea.” In the example you presented, the lack of situational awareness of the conditions and challenges faced by the average soldier in the First World War was inexcusable and led to erroneous decisions based on the perception and theory of the capabilities of those led, but not directly viewed, were in reality. It is easy to look at pieces on a plotting board or notes on a map and develop an idea of where to strike next, but when far removed from the mud, muck, and misery, these choices become ones originating from, what one pilot in my Medevac unit during my 2006-07 Iraq deployment referred to as, “echelons above reality.”
On the other hand, placing key figures in harm’s way could potentially damage subsequent operations by either eliminating such an important person or, if they are captured and interrogated, giving the enemy information on plans or much needed leverage for subsequent negotiations. A good example of the former would be Captain John Cromwell, who was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for sacrificing himself by going down with the USS Sculpin in 1943, rather than risk compromising codebreaking efforts and invasion plans to the Japanese during World War Two.[20] In terms of leverage, one only needs to look back a few years to the controversial trade of Bowe Bergdahl for Taliban leaders in 2014 to see the perils of losing military “commanders” in modern times.[21]
In the case of the First World War, the location of battlefield commanders in areas not close to the actual battlefield was a decision which was poorly-considered while being somewhat of a benefit at the same time. As we have seen, the command and control of these battlefields was unlike any challenge faced by military commanders up to that time, and losing anyone with a remote idea of what was going on in terms of tactical and strategic concepts would have been catastrophic in the succession of command. Location of the “controllers” of a battle has been, and always will be, a matter of finding the balance between reality and practicality.
“Do you think it was a good idea for the generals to allow subordinates to make command decisions instead of the Generals?”
I’ve tended to get long-winded on this idea on other posts, so I shall try to remain focused and relevant…
I will always maintain that an effective leader produces more effective leaders – not just results concerning the immediate task at hand. If a subordinate has a better idea or feel for the battle, then I think that a certain amount of delegation will always be wise. In the case of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, Haig’s biggest error was not to pass on what we now call “commander’s intent” to his subordinates and this decision lost the British momentum on the battlefield. Perhaps the size of the battlefield posed enough of an obstacle for his relenting to the desires to exploit chance opportunities when they arose,[22] but in this case, sharing information and allowing leeway in order to best meet the overall goals would have been decisive. At some level, as always, the overall responsibility for success or the blame for failure will always remain with the highest rank involved. However, if the leadership properly cultivates their command to make the best decisions based on the information available, then it would make sense that the successes are shared by all.
Part Four continues…
Bibliography
Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Accessed January 1, 2017. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost.
Taylor, Adam and Kevin Sieff. “Bowe Bergdahl was Traded for 5 Taliban Commanders. Here’s Who They Are.” Washington Post. 2014. Accessed January 1, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/02/bowe-bergdahl-was-traded-for-5-taliban-commanders-heres-who-they-are/?utm_term=.49413a5e96c5.
Vachon, Duane. “Country Before Dishonor – Captain John Philip Cromwell, USN, WW II, Medal of Honor (1901-1943).” Hawaii Reporter. 2012. Accessed January 1, 2017. http://www.hawaiireporter.com/country-before-dishonor-captain-john-philip-cromwell-usn-ww-ii-medal-of-honor-1901-1943/123.
[1] Hew Strachan, The First World War, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), accessed December 27, 2016. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost, 121.
[2] Ibid., 141.
[3] Ibid., 124.
[4] Ibid., 142.
[5] Ibid., 120.
[6] Ibid., 131-132.
[7] Ibid., 147.
[8] Ibid., 148.
[9] Ibid., 61.
[10] Ibid., 183.
[11] Ibid., 274.
[12] Ibid., 159.
[13] Ibid., 171.
[14] Ibid., 171.
[15] Ibid., 178.
[16] Ibid., 183.
[17] Ibid., 188.
[18] Ibid., 204.
[19] Ibid., 213.
[20] Duane Vachon, “Country Before Dishonor – Captain John Philip Cromwell, USN, WW II, Medal of Honor (1901-1943),” Hawaii Reporter, 2012, accessed January 1, 2017, http://www.hawaiireporter.com/country-before-dishonor-captain-john-philip-cromwell-usn-ww-ii-medal-of-honor-1901-1943/123.
[21] Adam Taylor and Kevin Sieff, “Bowe Bergdahl was Traded for 5 Taliban Commanders. Here’s Who They Are,” Washington Post, 2014, accessed January 1, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/02/bowe-bergdahl-was-traded-for-5-taliban-commanders-heres-who-they-are/?utm_term=.49413a5e96c5.
[22] Hew Strachan, The First World War, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), accessed January 1, 2017. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost, 172.
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