It is common for advances in military weapons and equipment, as well as tactics during conflicts. The Korean War is no different. One advancement was in the use of helicopters to supply men and equipment even to the front lines. What other developments occurred during this time? How significant was the delay in the development of the M-14, which ended up not being ready until after the war?
Aerial refueling of fighters was one of the more significant contributions to American airpower during the Korean War. As the earlier propeller-driven fighters slowly gave way to the new technology found in jet aircraft, the need for consistent fuel calculations became more critical to the fighter pilots patrolling the skies over North Korea in search of MiG’s. The habitual disregard to continue past the lowest safe amount of fuel required to return to base re-emphasized the need for aerial refueling support to increase the effectiveness of American fighters.[1] Demonstrated as an effective combat multiplier by Colonel David Schilling in October 1950, the concept of reducing the logistical difficulties of relocating fighters quickly was quickly adopted and put into action on July 6, 1951. Flying from Taegu, three RF-80’s refueled in the air over the Sea of Japan – increasing their range and allowing them to conduct aerial reconnaissance over North Korean high-value targets.[2]
Another contribution to warfare was the improvement of the basic infantryman’s rifle. Seeking to improve upon the reliable design of the M-1 Garand, the U.S. forces sought to increase both amount of rounds carried within the weapon from 8 to 20 rounds and the ability of the operator to select the rate of fire – from either semi-automatic to fully automatic fire – without overburdening the soldiers.[3] However, as most new developments, the M-14 was not immune to delays which hindered them becoming the primary weapon of U.S. troops until 1957. Problems with controllability during fully automatic fire, barrel overheating, operational environment difficulties, and bureaucratic indecision over the caliber requirements combined to retard the debut of the M-14 into circulation.[4]
Were there any other weapon systems that were slowed in coming on line in Korea?
The interesting thing with developmental delays in weapon system research and development is that much of the information prior to the digital age tends to be more difficult to find. Whether this would be a case of omission through disgrace or the fact that successful implementation of such technology eclipses documentation of failures is a topic of additional debate. However, the concept of air-to-air missiles is one which German researchers quietly worked on during the Second World War and seemingly became a feature on fighters overnight. The details of one such missile – the AIM-4 Falcon – provides a look at how Korean War helped and hindered the introduction of air-to-air missiles (AAM’s) in warfare.
The first ideas of AAM’s were worked on in desperation. The German Hs.298, the X-4, and the British Artemis missiles were projects which reached their developmental maturity in 1944, but it was the American Gorgon and JB-3 which lasted longer in the testing phase – being finally cancelled in September 1946. American efforts followed a convoluted series of proposals, studies, development, and program cancellations in the five years following the war, but the Hughes Guided Aircraft Rocket (GAR) program continued amidst the delays brought on by budgetary restrictions, continual redesign, and the Korean War.[5] With the war in Korea drawing much attention and resources from research and development in the post-Second World War years, the production of an effective guided AAM was significantly delayed by the efforts towards the production of all-weather interceptors like the Lockheed F-94 Starfire. Equipped with unguided rockets only, this fighter first flew in 1949 and though it saw service in the Korean War, signifies the Department of Defense’s continual shifting in priorities when it came to air-to-air warfare and the subsequent hindrance of the development of decisive weapon systems during the war in Korea.[6]
[The discussion wandered onto the topic of the acoustic vulnerabilities of the M-1 Garand.]
The argument/debate over the “ping” noise myth is one which I have come across many times in my research on military surplus weapons. I personally find the ongoing debate especially informative of the nature of such myths and how they move from conjecture to fact as the number of veterans with personal insight slowly diminishes.
A few months ago, I had the pleasure of my weekly range trips finding me a lane away from another regular who had finally cycled through his collection to his very lovely M-1. After chatting with him for a bit about the peculiarities of the Garand when it came to proper ammunition selection, I carefully watched him go through three en bloc clips – noting the last round and the sound of the clip being ejected. My own personal verdict: the myth of the sound being used by the enemy is another case of the gradual distortion of fact due to inexperience.
The M-1 is a loud rifle, though not as loud as the Soviet M-44. The sound of the clip being ejected of just one M-1 on a firing line with half a dozen other rifles being fired, while being audible from 50 feet away, is not loud enough to be heard over the cacophony of battle by an opponent on the receiving end of other small-arms fire. While it may be possible to focus and catch such a faint cue, the attention of an enemy soldier would more than likely be on maintaining cover, considering tactical options, or contending with the sound of his own returning fire. This being said, I hope to run into the guy again tomorrow in order to further study this phenomenon.
[On the benefits of aerial refueling…]
The longer they stayed over the battlefield it seems like from the reading the more successful the United Nations were in either their defense or when they were attacking the Communist forces.
Loiter time is one of those aspects of any aerial operation which can be critical to the success of the ground commanders. When I was in Afghanistan in 2004-05, the major determining factor for our AH-64 escorts was the enroute and on station time, as most folks know. In one instance, our entire flight ended up slightly pushing the “bingo fuel” point, or point of minimum fuel to return to base. I say “slightly” knowing that I have the kneeboard with those fuel numbers somewhere in my boxes of deployment stuff, but also knowing that we had often calculated a “planned” bingo and “contingency” reserve. It always helps being overly conservative, when it comes to fuel and ammunition. In this case, however, the two UH-60’s and four AH-64’s were able to provide much needed assistance to the ground forces and pick them up, rather than leave them there while we departed the area for the 40 or so minutes’ round trip for fuel. This was one of the major teaching points I used when I was instructing new crewchiefs – err heavily on the side of caution.
This leads me to my second point of the scenario which relates to your comment about the “helpfulness” of fully automatic primary weapons. In some cases, such a feature would be beneficial, but for most troops it tends to be a liability in that they often lose fire discipline once rounds start coming back. I say “most troops” not to disparage all combat arms, but to highlight the standardization efforts which resulted in only one type of weapon for all troops. In the scenario above, the forces we were supporting were… special… and their fire discipline would have improved their chances against the inevitable onslaught of enemy combatants which would have quickly learned the location of the American forces and the fact that they were cut off from air support for an indeterminable amount of time. Whether our customers went fully cyclic with their weapons or conserved ammunition would have only served to prolong their safety by a margin of only a few minutes – time which they didn’t have. Whether the combat takes place in the Hindu Kush or the mountains of the Korean peninsula, the feature of selective rates of fire is only as viable as the support available for resupply.
The story of the development of the M14 Rifle is a comical tail of military incompetence.
This is sadly the case with a lot of recent work by the Department of Defense. About a month ago, I came across a news article discussing the DoD’s intention to replace the Afghan National Army’s Russian Mi-17’s with older UH-60A’s which have been deemed “obsolete” in terms of continued use with the U.S. Army. It would seem that there was a request in November 2016 by the DoD to the tune of $814.5 million to make such a transfer possible.[7] What makes this noteworthy and borderline “comical” as you put it, is that the same office released a memo on October 3, 2014 discussing the scrapping of sixteen G222’s (cargo aircraft) due to the inability for the Afghan Air Force to perform the needed maintenance and logistic steps necessary to keep the aircraft serviceable. For this program, the initial cost was $486 million.[8]
Comical.
[1] Lawrence Spinetta, “MiG Madness: The Air War Over Korea,” historynet.com, 2008, accessed March 9, 2017, http://www.historynet.com/mig-madness-the-air-war-over-korea.htm.
[2] “History of Aerial Refueling: Fueling the Fighters,” US Fed News Service, Including US State New. April 17, 2009, accessed March 9, 2017, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/472818964?accountid=8289.
[3] John H. Smith, “The Squad and the M-14,” Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994) 44, no. 12 (12, 1960): 48-50, accessed March 9, 2017, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/206302820?accountid=8289, 48.
[4] Philip Schreier, “Cut Down in Its Youth,” nramuseum.org, 2001, accessed March 9, 2017, http://www.nramuseum.org/media/940585/m14.pdf, 26-27.
[5] Sean O’Connor, “Arming America’s Interceptors: The Hughes Falcon Missile Family,” ausairpower.net, 2012, accessed March 10, 2017, http://www.ausairpower.net/Falcon-Evolution.html#mozTocId176394.
[6] “Lockheed F-94 Starfire,” aircraft-in-focus.com, 2017, accessed March 10, 2017, http://aircraft-in-focus.com/lockheed-f-94-starfire/.
[7] “Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” sigar.mil, 2017, accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-01-30qr.pdf, 85.
[8] John F. Sopko to Charles T. Hagel, memorandum, October 3, 2014, “SIGAR-15-04-SP Inquiry Letter: G222 Disposition Notification Request,” sigar.mil, 2017, accessed March 12, 2017, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-15-04-SP_IL_G222%20Disposition%20Notf%20Req_03Oct2014_Redacted.pdf, 1.
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