The Korean War left several key lessons which benefit future students of history as well as executors of foreign policy: the importance of intelligence, logistics, and airpower.
The overall failure of American intelligence organs such as the newly-developed CIA provided a lesson which has consistently been reinforced in terms of the importance of accurate intelligence on a potentially aggressive state. With no officers in place prior to the 1950 invasion of South Korea by the forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the CIA had absolutely no assets or information regarding the composition and disposition of the belligerent forces.[1] Though this lesson went unheeded during later operations, the ability of the CIA to predict, with reasonable accuracy, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi army and highlighted the capacity for the organization to learn from past errors.[2]
Logistics played a key role as well in the offensive and defensive phases of the war. The terrain and weather of Korea, combined with the distance from major U.S. logistics hubs to pose an operational obstacle in repelling and pursuing the Communist forces during the war. With much of the early emphasis on the port of Pusan by the end of the summer of 1950, the tactical value of the 40,000-ton processing rate for the port of Pusan far outpaced the rail and road network’s 16,000 transport capacity, highlighting the need for effective pre-war planning as well as the development of contingency options in future conflicts.[3]
Finally, airpower was a deciding factor in many of the engagements between the besieged U.N. Forces retreating from the 38th parallel. In the case of Task Force Smith’s need for support, the arrival of airpower established the pattern which air support would continue to be effective in assisting the ground forces.[4]
These three areas, critical to the modern art of war, were hard-learned lessons from the Korean War and will remain to be focal points for future operations by successful national leaders and foreign policy.
A stated goal of the Korean War for the UN/US forces was to re-establish the 38th parallel and allow a democratic S. Korea to exist. If this was the overall goal of the war, why did the war continue until UN/US forces had united the peninsula for a time and were poised on the border with China? Many have answered this question by saying that this was the desire of Gen Mac Arthur (which it was). However, is the correct answer this simple?
Simplicity and history are concepts, when paired, are along the lines of my wife’s response of “I’m fine” when I ask her what is wrong. Luckily these two concepts are infrequent in nature.
Pursuit of an enemy is never really a simple solution for victory – the defeat of the enemy and rendering them incapable of subsequent military aggression, in my opinion, would offer a possible explanation for the allied push to the Chinese border. Being married to a Russian has offered me the benefit of being introduced to legendary figures of Russia’s past: Alexander Nevsky, Alexander Suvorov, and Mikhail Skobelev, to name a few. A quote from the latter in a textbook required for a previous class, therefore, made much more sense of the Russian attitude towards conflict: “I hold it as a principle that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they remain quiet.”[5]
In the case of the Korean War, the early aggression of the North Korean forces indicated a determination and ability to wage war against their southern neighbors, and in order to prevent a later repeat of the initial invasion and subsequent successes, the desire to inflict as much damage as possible to their forces would guarantee a lasting peace. In short, China was never a target of the allied forces until they began direct military support in North Korea, therefore, proceeding through North Korea up to the Chinese border was only a means to defeat only the North Koreans.
[1] Clayton Laurie, “The Korean War and the Central Intelligence Agency,” cia.gov, 2010, accessed March 13, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/2010-05-01.pdf, 6.
[2] “CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War,” cia.gov, 2007, accessed March 13, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/gulfwar/061997/support.htm.
[3] William J. Flanagan, and Harry L. Mayfield Jr, Korean War Logistics, The First One Hundred Days, 25 June 1950 to 2 October 1950, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1985), accessed March 13, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a157032.pdf, 49.
[4] Bong K. Lee, Unfinished War – Korea, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2007), accessed March 13, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central, 68.
[5] Williamson Murray, and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession. (West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2006), accessed March 17, 2017, ProQuest ebrary, 115.
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