Thoughts on Doctrine, Theory, and Flexibility

“How did the requirement for you to analyze the contributions of the major military philosophers and leaders assist you in your overall comprehension of military history?”
“What military leaders or military philosophers do you think helped shaped History the most?”

Working within the topic of the American submarine campaign of the Second World War, I have found that two theorists shaped naval warfare since the beginning of the 20^th century –Julian Corbett (1854-1922) and Alfred Mahan (1840-1914). Like many theorists who had previously discussed the importance and ideas of effective land warfare, Corbett and Mahan took the concepts behind maritime warfare and reached very natural conclusions of the effects of naval strategy can influence and dictate military and diplomatic affairs.

Theory and practice are two distinct and differing realities of war. Both Corbett and Mahan agreed on one point – the goal of naval warfare. Corbett maintained that “the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”[1] Mahan’s similar stance of naval tactics is both complex and simple: “…naval strategy, like naval tactics… is simply the proper use of means to attain ends.”[2] These theories, while effective, differed in practice in the example of the relatively ineffective Soviet Navy’s influence on the overall outcome of the Second World War despite their land victories. In this instance, the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany’s land forces far overshadowed the direct application of naval theory according to Corbett and Mahan due to the Soviet alliance with American and British naval efforts.[3]

Corbett and Mahan were directly responsible for shaping the naval doctrine of the major fleets during 20^th century, therefore can be credited with shaping History the most. However, even though the importance of maritime security has remained constant over the last century, the technological developments which have taken place since the time of these theorists have generated important counterpoints to these traditional views of theory and practice.^[4] History, like the societies, cultures, and people who are part of its process, is never static; new perspectives and associations will continue to shape how we view the past and how we interpret for the future.

Would you agree that it is fair to say that each generation of leaders/ philosophers builds on what the generation before them has learned? Why or why not?

I would honestly say that we learn from history and the previous generations of military leaders and philosophers, but the sad fact is that ego relegates any lessons that the past may offer to a role of trivial academic study. During the American Civil War (1861-1864) and the Crimean War (1853-1856), military leaders were educated in the contemporary theories of both Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869). The Crimean War turned into a battle of attrition for all involved participants and with the campaign in places like Sevastopol slowly turning public opinion sour in Britain, the shifting and strained alliances were unable to effectively maintain validity in similar continued actions.^[5] In the American Civil War, the military leadership failed to take into account the methods and manner in which conflicts escalate and sought to delay offensive and defensive preparations for the sake of political efforts to defuse the growing tension between the Confederacy and the Union.[6]

Theory is a dangerous tool. Theory creates predictability which may be exploited by potential enemies, while at the same time fosters an overwhelming overconfidence of leadership to place more emphasis on what should happen (according to theory) as opposed to what may happen (according to reality). One of the biggest problems with studying theory is that the ideas behind them are typically based upon known technology and capabilities. For modern commanders to base the foundation of their actions on “classical Clausewitzian strategy” is to completely miss the point Clausewitz made by asserting that theory should not “be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action.”[7] This, in my opinion, is the point of my earlier statement of egos becoming an obstruction to the effectiveness of the studies and applications of lessons learned from the past – theory has become doctrine. More emphasis has been placed on creating or shifting doctrine in modern times than has been expended in the fundamentals of warfare. Theory has built upon the basics of the ideas of Sun Tzu’s Art of War to the point where the basics are buried under layers of contemporary views of warfare without realizing that theory evolves slower and as a result of technology. This is where we have failed, and this is where we will continue to fail.

However, the only way to move into a new way of thinking and not always doing the same thing in war, theories must be presented to effect change.

I rambled a bit in my response to the professor on the topic of the dangers of theory, so you get the idea of my thoughts on the subject. As you have stated, militaries would repeat the same efforts over and over without theories, and I agree on this point. Theory, for me, is fascinating in that it essentially captures the contemporary viewpoints regarding statecraft and warfare. When theory becomes doctrine, I start to become worried, and when doctrine becomes the way to fight, I shift from “worried” to “irate.”

Doctrine and theory are critical in that they both are the efforts of application and study of conflict, whether it is armed or political. However, the hazard of strictly following both represent a lack of imagination and a certain inflexibility in the inevitable evolution of a threat. I find it interesting that I am coming across as extremely critical of doctrine, yet that is a key focus of my thesis. In thinking about it, even with this thesis, I am essentially supporting my concerns with doctrine.

Both Corbett and Mahan realized that maritime warfare – specifically, commerce raiding – were vital components of warfare in their theories. As we move closer to a potential military confrontation with Russia, commerce raiding will once again prove to be pivotal in any land war in Europe, validating their theories and the lessons of the First and Second World Wars. The difference now is that our current doctrine places technology, rather than numerical superiority as a key factor, and with the price of that technology, we have severely limited ourselves in the ability to react in terms of the process of conducting a war. One can’t learn a lesson of what not to do when the ships, aircraft, and vehicles represent a substantial individual investment for a nation. Essentially, we have no flexibility when it comes to modern warfare to enact the necessary efforts to modify current doctrine.

However, these are my thoughts. I am not privy to the information available to the military, political, and industrial leaders making the decisions. I can only hope that my perspective will only be a forgotten footnote in “some class a long time ago…”

[1] Julian Corbett, “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,” gutenberg.org, 2005, accessed May 30, 2017, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm#Page_52, 92.

[2] Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1911), 35.

[3] “The Soviet Navy at the Outbreak and During the Great Patriotic War: Introduction,” rusnavy.com, 2017, accessed May 30, 2017, http://rusnavy.com/history/io7.htm.

[4] Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics – Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 65.

[5] Andrew Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853–56, (Farnham, GB: Routledge, 2011), accessed May 31, 2017, ProQuest ebrary, 347.

[6] Donald Stoker, Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War, (Cary, GB: Oxford University Press, 2010), accessed May 31, 2017, ProQuest ebrary, 82.

[7] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141.