More thoughts from the academic forums…
Analyze: historical materials and make judgments to establish relationships and to answer why and how.
-How did formal studying assist you in your overall comprehension of Military History?
-Did you find as your studies continued you were able to better analyze sources and events instead of just basic information and facts?
-What aspect in college helped you learn to analyze?
My initial reluctance to start college courses was partially rooted in my concerns that my writing style would change from unstructured and original to formal and routine. During the course of my studies, I have come to learn that that writing styles and content are very much a function of the effort which an individual will put into their research and presentation – especially on the topic of Military History.
With any topic or academic focus, comprehension is ultimately part of a larger goal of both the author, student, and instructor. In my own studies, I have deliberately chosen topics relatively off the “beaten path” – the loss and recovery of nuclear weapons off the coast of Spain, the involvement of a corpse in one of the oddest stories of wartime deception, and early examples of courageous leadership in 18th century Russia. By avoiding more easily researched topics for classes, I have come to understand several things: events in history are rarely the cause of just a few key events, history is more than what everyone talks about, and that my writing style – when applied to academic pursuits – can and will only improve as I take on challenges like these.
In terms of analysis of sources, my studies have made me considerably more observant and critical of sources in media. One of the things I have noticed recently is that I have a hard time reading one news item without questioning why their sources were not indicated, either by footnotes or by hypertext links. When it comes to information such as this, the authenticity of the author as well as their words and motivation is immediately questioned. The same applies to history texts – books relying heavily on tertiary sources may contradict older books, but the point of the book may be to revisit previously disputed facts between sources.
As far what aspect of a formal educational syllabus has helped me the most in developing my analytic process, I would venture to say that all of it assisted me in one form or another. Of course, there have been occasions where what the instructor wanted (indentations on footnotes, for example) differed from what was acceptable to other professors up to that point; for the most part, the entire process has been extremely helpful in refining my style, choice of topic, and presentation of history in a way that is more engaging for the audience.
One of the biggest things I have taken away from my studies is that wars do not happen in bubbles. They are fluid events with a number of different aspects from politics and society playing a role in there beginning, ending, and everything in between.
I recently became addicted to started following
Quora, and one of the types of questions that rankles me are the “What were the
cause of…” questions involving major conflicts. It seems that for many folks,
there is an easy answer for why wars start. In mulling over a recent query
about the causes of the First World War, my initial urge was to offer a reply
which placed the blame on the events in Europe going back to the 18th
century. While this would be factually correct, the problem with this approach
is that most people are not history
majors and more than likely to get bored with such an in-depth analysis. In the
end, I passed on that answer, but these types of questions are more common than
I would expect.
One of the things I have found interesting about our choice of academic pursuits is the fact that we often tend to look at a much larger picture than most disciplines. In many of my more substantial papers, I have had to illustrate points from a sociological, economical, and political perspective in order to support my statements. It is hard to discuss submarine warfare in the Second World War without understanding the cultural motivations for Japanese reluctance to give up strategic locations, the reliance on imported goods via shipping, and the effort to pressure Japanese political leadership into submission by denying them the resources and transportation assets necessary for their continued aggression.
What fascinates me is the fact that these lessons on the overall fragility of ocean-going lanes of transit are lost on the current policy makers. During the Second World War, our submarine campaign against the Japanese was conducted by our smallest portion of our naval strength – our submarine forces were only 2% of the U.S. Navy’s total strength – yet they were responsible for over half of the Japanese losses.[1] With our current U.S. flag merchant fleet of 169 ships, the perils of our shipping in the face of a dedicated opponent with even a slight capacity to employ submarines are somewhat obvious.[2]
You are correct – wars do not happen in bubbles… However, it would seem that those
responsible for preventing them, do.
[1] “Summaries of Japanese Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes,” ibiblio.org, n.d., accessed May 16, 2017, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJN/JANAC-Losses/JANAC-Losses-2.html.
[2] Bureau of Transportation Statistics, “Table 1-24: Number and Size of the U.S. Flag Merchant Fleet and its Share of the World Fleet,” rita.dot.gov, accessed May 16, 2017, https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_24.html.
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