Rushed or Deliberate: More Thoughts on Conscription

Is it better for a nation losing a war to rush conscripts into combat or to train them properly and only add them when they can actually fight?

There is never a simple answer when it comes to the use of conscripts in conflict. There are so many different aspects of the scenario to consider – the geopolitical pressures/alliances, societal factors, and the duration, type, severity of the impending loss, and initiation factors of the conflict itself.

Geopolitical pressures/alliances

If alliances are faltering, the justification to willingly throw those who would be vital to the post-conflict rebuilding and reorganization would be heavily scrutinized.

Societal factors

Public opinion on the conflict and the perceived direction it is taking would dictate the overall willingness or reluctance to submit for obligatory service. This would play a role in determining which approach would be necessary – if there is reluctance for the conflict from the beginning, then justifying the activation of a national mandatory conscription initiative will further sour public opinion towards both the conflict and the political leadership responsible.

Duration

With the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan a good example, the overall public interest in a war slowly gives way to weariness before transitioning into full-blown disapproval. Going back to the above societal factors, the longer a war goes on with no victory in sight, the harder it is to continue the war.

Type

This could be simply put into terms of “aggression/defensive.” A nation which is the primary aggressor would find it harder to generate motivated or capable replacements when their goals are not met within a reasonable timeframe; conversely, a defensive nation stands to lose much more, therefore it may be easier to find citizens who are willing to take up arms to defend their homeland.

Severity of the impending loss

This is a bit more difficult to classify, as it brings type, duration, and societal factors of a conflict into play. If conscripts are called to hold captured territory, then it is becomes questionable how hard the average person would be willing to fight for it. On the other hand, much like the near loss of Moscow as well as the occupation of Berlin in the Second World War, the direct threat to a nation’s political heart often increases the ferocity of the efforts to prevent their loss.

“…Rush into combat…”

War is never really a sudden event. Yes, there may be an event which triggers it, or another which becomes a solid turning point of the conflict, but – for the most part – major conflicts progress slowly and the outlook of the tactical and strategic situation is somewhat predictable. For fast-burning wars like the Six-Day War of 1967, there is simply no time for the losing side (in this case, any side not Israel) to bring up conscripts to fill the personnel losses. Longer conflicts, like the Second World War gave the political and military leaders ample time to assess losses and implement controls, albeit with grave repercussions for their own post-war reconstruction and return to normalcy.

For Germany, while the decision to start conscription occurred four years before the actual start of the conflict, the overall lack of progress on the Eastern Front required desperate measures which only compounded the closer the Red Army approached from the East and the Allies from the West. The creation of the Volksstrum and direct application of Hitler Youth in the defense of Berlin stands as sufficient examples of what happens when you rush hastily-trained troops as a measure of defense against seasoned soldiers.

The same applies for the preparations for the defense of the Japanese Home Islands. Operation Ketsugō remains a contested hypothetical among published and recreational historians alike; however, the projected casualties from the planned Japanese “defense in depth” utilizing almost every citizen possible would have been catastrophic for a nation already decimated/demoralized by strategic firebombing and logistic strangulation by American submarines.

This leads me to the aspect of effective training of conscripts prior to employment as soldiers. Who would be best put to train these last-ditch fighters? If the situation is dire enough, no military leader in their right mind would take NCOs from the fluid front lines to for the purpose of training those who were unable or unwilling to serve in the first place.

Could those NCOs recovering from injuries far from the fighting conduct the training? Sure, however, there would be no guarantee quality training due to the severity of their injuries – after all, in this hypothetical situation, things would already be looking bleak enough to warrant only the most severe of injuries to be relocated away from the fighting.

I have written along these lines before, and my observations from earlier still stand:

Voluntary or Obligatory?

Compulsory or nationally mandated service could work – and has – for nations under constant threat for survival… or with a much more effective national will/identity necessitating such measures.

If the US army suffered severe casualties, how quickly could a civilian force be made operational?

Conscription would be a disaster – compulsory service never brings out the cream of the crop in terms of patriotism and civic duty.

“The only thing you mustn’t do is lose!”

One of the more interesting quotes I have come across recently is Erich Raeder’s blunt reaction to Nimitz’s acknowledgment of American unrestricted submarine warfare during the Second World War:

“You see! Unrestricted warfare! – anything is permitted as long as you win! The only thing you mustn’t do is lose!”

Hand-to-hand and Corners

…[R]egardless of training or national identity, the best hand to hand fighter will always be the individual with no other recourse and option but to do everything they can to survive…

To sum up, the earlier a nation on the losing side of a defensive conflict can introduce deliberate training for a potential defense force made up of conscripts, the better. However, such actions would only be as good as the national will to fight in said conflict as well as the conduct of the military and political leadership up to and during the war.

Hastily training and rushing conscripts into an unpopular war rarely results in victory – either short- or long-term and on the battlefields of terrain or public opinion.