In going through some of my older answers on Quora, I noticed that some have not made it here – probably out of annoyance at the recurring theme of specificity. Some questions just feel… probing. However, skirting around the heart of the matter can lead to an interesting perspective on procurement.
If heat seeking missiles can be attracted to flares so easily, why does everyone still equip heat seeking missiles?”
Oh, there are so many different and interesting aspects to this question.
I love Mitch’s answer about the physics of IR missile engagement; Mitch, along with Jon, and Susanna also touched on one of the most important aspects of IR weaponry – affordability.
The relative “ease” of attraction part of the question has already been addressed – seeker guidance is never truly a simple affair. The pattern is never-ending, as well: a seeker is developed, and countermeasures show up shortly after fielding… requiring counter-countermeasures, which lead to counter-counter-countermeasures… A vicious cycle.
What is not specifically brought up in the outstanding answers before this one is the proliferation of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) in places like the Middle East and Africa – the primary sources and markets for such systems.
In thinking about the spirit of the question – “why does everyone still equip heat seeking missiles”– what I take from the query is, essentially, “why does anyone use heat-seeking missiles at all.” To answer that, one would have to look at a few key things: motivation, capability, and accessibility.
Motivation, in terms of most of the advanced weaponry sought out in the black market or dark web, may be nothing more than gaining a tactical edge in an asymmetric war or obtaining another tool to be employed by terrorists. A MANPAD can be an effective equalizer in the face of a technologically advanced adversary. The Mujahideen of Afghanistan understood this during their decade-long war against the Soviets in the 1980s. From The Bear Went Over the Mountain – Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan:
The Soviet advantage was found in the skies. The Soviet helicopter gunship was a very significant system in the war. Their Mi-24 HIND was the most dreaded and effective weapons system employed against the mujahideen until 1988, when “Stinger” portable surface-to air missiles limited their ability to range freely over resistance-controlled areas. The Soviet military would have liked to employ far more helicopters in Afghanistan, however, the lack of maintenance facilities, the increased logistics demand and the lack of secure operating bases prevented this. The Soviets were unwilling (or unable) to make a larger logistic and psychological commitment to the war.
This threat does not merely apply to military operations, either. According to the U.S. State Department, “since 1975, 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by MANPADS, causing about 28 crashes and more than 800 deaths around the world.” The ideology behind such attacks is as varied as the types of groups responsible for them; however, it is quite apparent that, if there is a will to bring down aircraft, such groups will find a way.
Capability is a bit trickier and involves looking at the training involved in employing these weapons. The U.S. Army’s training for soldiers becoming a 14P (Air and Missile Defense Crewmember) is 10 weeks of Basic and another 10 weeks of Advanced Individual Training, but they are instructed in far more detail about the different weapons systems used by the Army than just the FIM-92 Stinger. I cannot find references or examples of the process involved in doing so for non-military personnel, though if the “best educated, most effective warriors” of the Mujahideen were able to have plausible impact on the Soviet aviation forces in Afghanistan, then it would be logical to estimate that the training – when administered to those best motivated – wouldn’t be too far beyond the grasp of the average person.
Finally, accessibility is the main issue for both proliferation and efforts to deter it. One of the more disconcerting publications I often find myself browsing is smallarmssurvey.org out of Switzerland, where one can find recent discussions on what is known about contemporary arms trading and usage in conflicts around the globe:
While no prices were publicly advertised [in Libyan online arms trading groups] for the 9K32M (Strela-2M) systems, two of the 9P58 gripstock units were advertised with asking prices of LYD 8,000 (USD 5,800) and LYD 4,000 (USD 2,900) in March and October 2015, respectively.
“If heat seeking missiles can be attracted to flares so easily, why does everyone still equip heat seeking missiles?”
Simply put, because MANPADS are still a viable threat to all aviation assets operating in contested airspace… and flares are the cheapest and most effective form of countermeasures… for now.
Any discussion beyond that pushes my personal comfort level… again.
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