How They Became Legends (Part 4 of 8)

Continued from Part 3…

Interwar Doctrine and the Submarine School

For submarines, the doctrine during the interwar period was marked by rapidly evolving technology and the need for innovative and resourceful leaders to capitalize on the changes in submarine warfare. The fleet problems provided foreshadowing into the problems involving submerged approaches to targets and the subsequent torpedo attacks. Officiants to these exercises often failed to appreciate and understand the aspects of torpedo engagements and often assigned arbitrary estimations of the effective “hits” of the notional weapons as 30% based on their own personal judgement.^[1] Similarly, the lack of effective background in submarine operations by senior surface commanders were influenced by the limitations of the rules established for these fleet problems to promote the “absolute necessity for submarines in smooth water to conduct their attacks from deep submergence using sound equipment only.”^[2]

This pervasive optimism, coupled with the attitude that unrestricted warfare from the First World War was an “aberration,” and an overreactive approach to safety as a result of several highly-publicized accidents involving submarines in the 1920s not only hindered the development of the most effective use of submarines, but also negatively influenced the development of American anti-submarine efforts.^[3] Relegated to a defensive role as part of the Asiatic Fleet stationed in the Philippines, submarines were considered more of a tool intended to delay any aggression by the Imperial Japanese Navy long enough for relief to arrive from Hawaii, and the American bases on the West and East coasts – the latter through the Panama Canal.^[4]

The challenges of determining the order of precedence in the cause-and-effect evolution of submarine warfare during the interwar period involve understanding the relationship between capability and intention. With early submarines, the limitation of their designs limited considerations of their effectiveness as a long-range offensive asset. The interwar period, however, saw the influences of leaders within the American submarine force urging drastic design changes which led to submarines becoming key maritime interdiction platforms during the Second World War. The combined efforts of respected and experienced submariners Thomas Hart and Charles Lockwood after the First World War resulted in a gradual shift from the smaller and slower S-boats to a production emphasis on the larger “fleet” submarines which were capable of operations with surface warfare groups as scouts or secondary direct support assets.^[5]

As aircraft were better suited for the role of scouting and were increasingly incorporated onto cruisers and battleships for the specific purpose of scouting and observation, a return to the concept of extended patrols into enemy controlled waters dictated an increase in range, endurance, and firepower for American submarines. Recommendations made by both Hart and Lockwood in 1938 called for future submarines to be capable of diving in under one minute, outfitted with fore and aft torpedo tubes, equipped with deck-mounted guns, and sufficiently stocked with enough food and fuel for patrols lasting up to three weeks and extending beyond 5,900 nautical miles.^[6] Though these capabilities had been evident in some of the designs prior to 1938, the shift from defensive to offensive doctrine, in terms of design, coincided with the shift in the training and development at the United States Submarine School in New London, Connecticut.

The selection and process of transitioning either directly from the surface fleet or, for enlisted sailors upon completion of the various service schools within the Navy, were dependent on a variety of factors; the common factor, however, was the fact that all who served aboard submarines were volunteers who received specialized training at the Submarine School in New London, Connecticut. Established as a submarine base and the Submarine School in 1916, changes placed upon naval facilities at New London dictated a steady growth following the end of the First World War during the interwar years and an accelerated period of expansion during the few years preceding the America’s entry into the Second World War.^[7] The application process for attendance at the school, for officers, was conditional. For ensigns, along with flight training at Pensacola, Florida, submarine training at New London was not available until two years’ experience was maintained in the surface fleet and their annual “reports of fitness” showed qualification “to stand watch as officer of the deck underway.”^[8] The requirement  integral of the application process for solely for officers – the approval and involvement of their commanding officer – was in addition to the approval of the medical officer declaring the applicants’ medical qualification for service on submarines.^[9] The advocacy of the previous commander, coupled with the documented ability to satisfactorily perform the basic component of a professional naval officer served as an indication of the maturity and leadership potential of men who would rise to the challenges and complexities of service in submarines. As all officers assigned to submarines were expected to frequently stand watch during wartime patrols, they assumed the responsibility for the ship and were effectively entrusted with command of a warship much earlier than their peers.^[10]

As the most important part of the selection and application process for all potential submariners, the medical screening was detailed and thorough. Pre-war interest in the medical aspect of submarine operations were limited to less than ten medical officers, with the focus of their experience upon the physiological aspects of deep-sea diving.^[11] With medical care onboard submarines on patrol limited to care provided by the pharmacist’s mate tending to routine illnesses and injuries incurred in the line of duty, pre-existing conditions or chronic medical issues would not only limit the effectiveness of the submarine’s patrol, but increase the workload on the crew as task-sharing would be imperative to ensure the safety of the boat.^[12] Medical examinations prior to selection for attendance at the Submarine School a list of twelve benchmarks, including dental evaluations to guarantee the ability to use the breathing equipment used in escape, additional vision and hearing tests, as well as basic psychological tests.^[13]

As examples of the tenacity of character exhibited by those who desired not only a commission as an officer in the United States Navy, Eugene Fluckey’s eyesight had nearly resulted in expulsion from the Naval Academy in 1934 due to nearsightedness. Passing the final tests with his vision improved through a series of progressive prescriptions and self-directed strengthening exercises, Fluckey – deemed “an embarrassment to the naval medical profession” for his studious and stubborn determination – graduated the Academy in 1934 and completed Submarine School in 1938.^[14] Lawson Ramage’s solution for similar poor vision due to an injury received at the Naval Academy was simple and effective – by memorizing the chart for his initial application and using his uninjured eye for an exam to determine the vision of each eye, he was accepted to the Submarine School in 1935.^[15] Perseverance compelled such candidates, produced by the Naval Academy and refined through experience, for the specialized and complex training to wage submarine warfare and were filtered through the admission process and proceeded to New London.

The Submarine School, for those officers approved to attend, was multifaceted and intense. Each year, training at New London began in the beginning of January and July and lasted five and a half months.^[16]Academic work in the mornings gave way to afternoons of practical exercises on attack trainers, ship handling on surplus submarines from the First World War, and scenario-based training where instructors would intentionally establish difficult conditions for the students to promote innovation and cooperation as the only keys to success.^[17] The submarine force during the last few years of peace possessed more available open positions on operational submarines than graduates of the school in New London, leaving competition to be self-directed rather than direct; however, complacency and a casual approach towards mastery of the skills required of the officers was grounds for immediate classification as “unfit for submarine duty” and immediately removed from training. The ungainly and foreign design of the submarines themselves contributed greatly to the students’ mental stress due to the difficulties in even the simplest task of getting underway and mooring back on the docks.^[18]

As submarine warfare was complex in practice as it was in theory, the efforts of the school stressed an approach to leadership that drew influence and experience from the careers of naval officers prior to their arrival at New London. Coordination, cooperation, and reliability for the complex task of diving fostered a sense of safety through teamwork, and effective leadership to unify action with intent.^[19] Upon completion of the school and assignment to an operational boat, the proper qualification as a submariner was a thorough and deliberate process. Qualification required recommendation from the skipper, an oral or written examination based upon knowledge of submarines and associated equipment, preparation, leadership, temperament, and efficiency as well as a practical test determining handling, operation, attack, and navigation.^[20]

As a final step towards command for executive officers deemed worthy of command, the establishment of the Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) School on the eve of the start of the Second World War correlated practice with contemporary doctrine. Where the Submarine School focused on the fundamentals of service aboard submarines, the PCO school was established early as an advanced course offering realistic training and evaluations of attacking.^[21] Due to the quickened pace of combat operations during the war, the integration and communication between the academic and operational components responsible for the development of doctrine was necessary.  A month-long course with no more than 10 students per class, the PCO course was led by experienced skippers and produced 434 graduates in 63 classes held throughout the duration of the war.^[22] Most importantly, though, the PCO school provided the officers with an extended network within the submarine force and would provide the foundation and credibility which would be vital during the inevitable war in the Pacific. The education process which led to the wartime submarine skippers, started with the Naval Academy and culminated in this final course as the United States Navy’s efforts to “lead, not follow, in the submarine operation, warfare, strategy, and tactics… quick to take up new progressive ideas.”^[23]

Next: The Evolution of Threat…

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[1] Albert A. Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940, 41.

[2] Ibid., 233.

[3] Ibid., 307.

[4] Hunter Stires, “1941 Asiatic Fleet Offers Strategic Lessons,” USNI Proceedings 142, no. 8 (2016), accessed June 25, 2017, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016-08/1941-asiatic-fleet-offers-strategic-lessons.

[5] Friedman, 100, 222.

[6] Ibid., 223.

[7] “Naval Submarine Base New London – History,” cnic.navy.mil, accessed June 25, 2017, https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrma/installations/navsubbase_new_london/about/history.html.

[8] United States Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), accessed June 25, 2017, https://ia902604.us.archive.org/7/items/bureauofnavalper00unit/bureauofnavalper00unit.pdf, 26.

[9] Ibid., 321.

[10] Henry Felsen, He’s in Submarines Now, (New York, NY: Robert M. McBride & Co. 1942), accessed June 25, 2017, 128.

[11] C.W. Schilling, History of Submarine Medicine in World War II (New London, CT: U.S. Medical Research Laboratory, 1947), 2.

[12] Ibid., 12.

[13] Ibid., 14-15.

[14] Carl LaVO, The Galloping Ghost (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 10-14, 33.

[15] Stephen Moore, Battle Surface!: Lawson P. “Red” Ramage and the War Patrols of the USS Parche (New York, NY, USA: Naval Institute Press, 2011), accessed June 25, 2017, ProQuest ebrary, 6.

[16] United States Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, 322.

[17] Schratz, 25-26.

[18] Ibid., 26, 27.

[19] Ernest W. Brown, “The Human Mechanism and the Submarine,” USNI Proceedings 66, no. 10 (1940): 1608-1613, accessed June 25, 2017, https://www.usni.org/document/brown-ernest-1940-66-11-453?magazine_article=46176, 1608-1609.

[20] United States Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), 322.

[21] Schratz, 29.

[22] Arnold Lotring and Jeff Fowler, “PCO Training: Making the Best Better,” public.navy.mil, 1999, accessed June 25, 2017, http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_05/pco_training.html.

[23] Barnes, 129.