How They Became Legends (Part 2 of 8)

Continued from Part 1 …

History, in short, gives you all the qualifying factors; whereas reason, in love with its own refinements, is liable to overlook that which should modify them. ^[1] – Alfred Thayer Mahan

Leadership, in its modern manifestation, has become a formal academic process which analyzes motivation, inspiration, and communication in relation to achieving an organizational goal. Within the public and private sector, leadership has become a lucrative industry generating $14 billion in 2013 from a multitude of courses, programs, and consultation services. On the surface, such an effort and investment to develop leaders is commendable; however, the challenges of evaluating the overall success of these endeavors prevents an accurate assessment of their effectiveness.^[2] As leadership is far from a novel concept, an understanding of how historic examples of past education, challenges, and successes provides an effective template in future applications of organizational influence, management, and mentorship.

The Second World War provides an endless list of leadership examples – both effective and ineffective – with documented processes of development of these leaders prior to the conflict, their contributions to historic events, and the evaluation of their respective successes and failures. Within the pages of history books around the world, exploits of selfless responsibility, loyalty, and dedication can be easily found. In some cases, such as the men who commanded American submarines in the Pacific Theater of Operations between December 1941 through September 1945, their roles in history as leaders have been the subject of texts and movies, however, the underlying process of how they became legendary figures has received little detailed discussion.^[3] Prior to the Second World War, the professional leadership development of American submariners starting at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, created the foundation for the rapid evolution in doctrine necessary for the success of the American submarine campaign against the Japanese in Pacific Theater of Operations during the Second World War. Faced with a determined enemy, a hostile operational environment, and plagued by problematic weaponry as well as bureaucratic challenges, success as well as failure for these men, known as “skippers,” was often a matter of training, individual values, knowledge, and – most importantly – opportunity.

The Origins of Submarine Doctrine

Following end of the First World War on November 11, 1918, American naval doctrine underwent a series of evolutionary shifts before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. While these changes were profound, it is vital to understand the impetus and significance of the motivating factors for the progressive shift from heavily armored battleships comprising the bulk of the naval forces to the inclusion of aircraft carriers and submarines as valuable assets. During this first war of the 20^th century, submarines represented one of many technologically advanced vessels which were debuted during the war; for the contemporary military and political leadership, the broad tactical and strategic applications for these novel craft were relatively unknown.

Developed initially as a desperate effort for the Confederate Navy during the American Civil War (1861-1865), the first effective example of the modern wartime submarine was the Hunley, which proved the concept of submerged attack on surface warships during its attack on the USS Housatonic in 1864.^[4] Like the Hunley, early submarines of the 18^th century like the Intelligent Whale, were utilized on a limited basis by the US Navy in an experimental capacity and the relatively small crews of 10 volunteers were essentially the propulsion of these small hand-powered craft.^[5] Subsequent designs were powered by steam, and later, gasoline engines on the surface; underwater propulsion was provided by electric motors operated from banks of large batteries.

American submarines were plagued by numerous developmental problems associated with the new technology and these first crews were witnesses, victims, and culprits in several accidents resulting from negligence, inexperience, or chance.^[6] Cumbersome on the surface and a tactical liability as they submerged, the value of these craft, with dive times often less than three and a half minutes, the strategic value of submarines was lost to Navy leadership prior to the First World War.^[7] Viewed as a “plaything for the younger officers…diverting time and money from other more useful and dependable branches of the service,” American efforts in pursuing an active role in establishing these small warships as capable tactical and strategic asset were placed secondary to surface warships such as the contemporary battleships, battlecruisers, and destroyers.^[8]

The First World War seriously altered traditional views of naval warfare. The effectiveness of German U-boats in their campaign of “unrestricted submarine warfare” against American, British, and French shipping during the First World War was a dire lesson unheeded. The Imperial German Navy built 373 U-boats during the war and of these, 178 were lost due to the Allied anti-submarine effort. With a ratio of one U-boat lost for every 32 Allied ships sunk, the effectiveness of this campaign against the maritime “lines of communication” in the Atlantic was reflected in the final tallies of Allied shipping destroyed by U-boats: 5,708 merchant ships and around 11 million tons of supplies vital to the land war in Western Europe failed to reach their final ports.^[9] American submariners under the command of Captain Thomas C. Hart (1877-1971) were tasked with learning the complexities of operating surrendered German U-boats and returned six to the united states following the Armistice of 1919 for post-war public relations as well as a comprehensive naval study and evaluation of the German technology and its relation to submarine warfare doctrine.^[10]

Along with Hart, the names of Naval Academy graduates who would later lead American naval forces through the interwar period and into the Second World War became associated with the appraisal, development, and evolution of the American submarine effort. Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966) joined Hart in 1919 during the early efforts to model American submarines on the German designs. Advocating the offensive benefit of the independent, long-range submarine over the cooperative efforts of smaller, defensive variants favored by the naval leadership of the time, Nimitz’s foresight helped shape the basis for American submarine design.^[11] Charles A. Lockwood (1890-1967), who would later become Commander, Submarines Pacific Fleet in the Second World War, took command of one of the six U-boats of the fleet, in 1920, the UC-97, for its voyage the up the St. Lawrence canal and into the Great Lakes as part of a recruiting drive Victory Bond campaign.^[12] Ralph W. Christie (1893-1987), was critical in the early development of the primary offensive weapon of the American submarines, the torpedo, following the First World War.^[13] During the Second World War, Christie would obstinately clash with his subordinates and Lockwood over the performance of the Mark 14 torpedo in the first half of the war.^[14] These men, closely associated with undersea warfare from the beginning of the 20^th century, were instrumental in the development of the principles and participants of the inevitable submarine campaign in the conflict which was shaping in the Pacific.

Next: Interwar Doctrine and the United States Naval Academy…

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[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1911), 16.

[2] Robert B. Kaiser and Gordy Curphy, “Leadership Development: The Failure of an Industry and the Opportunity for Consulting Psychologists,” Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research 65, no. 4 (2013): 294-302, accessed June 25, 2017, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1501369638?accountid=8289, 294-295.

[3] “The American Submarine: a Select Filmography & Bibliography,” public.navy.mil, n.d., accessed June 25, 2017, http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_07/films_books.htm.

[4] Robert Barnes, United States Submarines (New Haven, CT: H. F. Morse Associates, Inc., 1944), 11.

[5] Ibid., 13.

[6] Ibid., 22.

[7] Ibid., 99.

[8] Ibid., 59.

[9] Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975), 24.

[10] Barnes, 113.

[11] Norman Friedman, US Submarines Through 1945: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 107.

[12] Chris Dubbs, America’s U-Boats (Lincoln: UNP – Nebraska, 2014), accessed June 25, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central, 91.

[13] Blair, 33.

[14] Ibid., 386.