Romanticism and Reality – Changes From the First World War

Sometimes, the idea of warfare is greatly distorted from the brutal truths behind the act of waging warfare – whether it be small-scale regional conflicts or the Clausewitzian “total war” that the Second World War became. This paper was inspired by the question of “what changed?” in the last two centuries in terms of how the blind idealism and romanticism of warfare may (or may not have) shifted in the public and political eye.

Warfare has held a certain mystique for males of all ages throughout human history. The fascination of the equipment, the abstracts of strategy, and the pride of victory have provided inspiration and firmly captured the imagination in the past as it will continue to do so in the future. Statesman and soldier Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) offered the pre-First World War perspective in his praise for warfare in that “man’s noblest virtues come into play: courage and renunciation, fidelity to duty and a readiness for sacrifice that does not stop short of offering up Life itself.”^[1] However, von Molke, though influential in German pre-war planning, would not live to see the unprecedented scope of total war which became known as the “Great War”. This conflict at the beginning of the 20^th Century would indirectly define warfare for subsequent generations, and realign the ideology of the nations involved in the fighting, for with the advent of new technology and schools of thought, the previously held romanticism of warfare was cast aside for the modern realities and brutal honesty of the effects of armed conflict.

 Myth

The remaining literature and memoirs of the days preceding the First World War offer a perspective of life prior to 1914 which has been described as “retrospectively intensified” for the sake of illustrating the contrast between an idyllic peace and the savagery which followed shortly thereafter.^[2] Victorian influence throughout England remained, and provided a moral guideline by which British citizens lived by. “Responsibility, self-control, and self-maintenance”, while an admirable code by which civilized societies enjoyed, provided little preparation for the experiences those sent to fight in the First World War eventually encountered.^[3]  Peace, at least for the British, reinforced the civilian understanding of conflict as effectively remaining unchanged in view of the advances in technology. This belief in stasis, however, proved to be far from the truth and far from the overall awareness of those who enlisted in response to the threat of war. Most of the youth prior to 1914, discussions of technological advances were conspicuously absent from the liberal arts curriculum of the British education system where Greek classic literature took precedence over science and technology. ^[4] It was the mythology of warfare through real and fictional heroes which provided the foundation by which impressionable young men and the society which facilitated and supported such interest which promoted warfare to be a means for one to generate their own legacy in which they “fought bravely, lived chivalrously, and died gloriously” in hopes for the idea of “virtuous manhood” ^[5]

Mechanism

Warfare evolved via the industrial revolution at a pace unimaginable to the people of the time and remains impressive a century later. Communications and logistics provided benefits to armies as easily as it did for the civilian economy; it was with these two components that nations could fully exploit the coordination and movement of massive amounts of arms and ammunition, improved artillery, and the use of chemical weapons. While military advances included the development and use of submarines and aircraft, it was breech-loading rifles, belt-fed machine guns and enormous cannons which cratered the Belgian and French countryside and provided those who experienced it a proximity to death in a way which was not previously considered possible.^[6] Disillusionment in the romantic myth of warfare came in the form of the range, power, and rate of modern weapons and their ability to dispassionately wage warfare without regards to any notions of bravery or nobility.^[7] The sheer scope of the battle offered little chance the myth of romanticism on the battlefield would persist and prevail. As an example of the challenge the idea of warfare stood against the reality, the effort to breach the Hindenburg Line in September of 1918, proved to be one of the largest artillery bombardments during a 24-hour period. During this attack on a front of not more than 10,000 yards, 945,052 shells were fired by a total of 1,637 guns, successfully breaching the German lines on the 29^th of September. ^[8] Lending credit to the some of the myth behind the virtues of combat was the rapid adaptation and processing of information which increased the chances of survival for the experienced infantry soldier and the ability to properly and effectively assess risk without becoming lost in the process of categorizing and appreciating the inherent dangers. ^[9]

Manner

It was not unrealistic of a battlefield commander to want to rid himself of men suffering from shell-shock due to the proximity to the actual combat and the difficulty in returning mentally compromised men back to service through limited but poor treatment facilities on the front line.^[10] Transit of those afflicted with shell-shock was of the of the utmost importance due to the critical need for the forward hospitals to deal with the immense numbers of various casualties, however, medicine had fared better in the recent advances, becoming more professionalized as a result.^[11] At the same time, however, even doctors were susceptible to shell-shock, and on occasion experienced some of the same symptoms as the men which they treated, including unexplained illness, and difficulty in processing the passage of time.^[12] British treatment of shell shock during and immediately after the war was initially, an effort to categorize hospitals and provide a distinction between those suffering from shell-shock and other mental disorders. This undertaking by Lord Knutsford and Cecil Harmsworth, was an attempt to reduce the overall negative perception of the soldiers returning from war. ^[13]

In 1914, psychology was a relatively new science which had been only been existence for about 35 years.^[14] For civilian doctors, the possibility for studying and participating in research in treating shell-shock was considered to be an “intellectual death” in that mental illness was uniformly expected to be encountered, and appropriately treated, only in asylums. Located far from cities and towns, typically deplorable in condition, asylums were removed from research and development in treatment.^[15] Promises of pensions undelivered added to the stresses of servicemen recently returned from the war. Adaptation was difficult after the frequency and ferocity of fighting which some experienced mostly because the ideas of life outside of the war proved contrary to what they actually expected. Much to the concern of the public, the numbers of former servicemen committed to asylums actually increased against the hope of full recovery.^[16] The resulting change in the way warfare was viewed by the British was a staunch refusal to accept the causes and understanding of shell-shock due to cultural influences. As a result of this lack of appreciation and understanding of the mental stresses resulting from prolonged battlefield exposure, the British failed to fully anticipate the level of research and change military psychiatry needed prior to the next war.^[17]

Australian efforts, however, differed greatly in their incorporation of lessons learned and experience gained by the returning nurses and medical officers. While the issue of shell-shock was discussed and trained for in the civilian sector, the Australian military failed to adopt any of these gains into official and effective policy during the inter-war period. As a result, the resurgence of shell-shock and other associated mental illnesses experienced by Australian soldiers during the Second World War was once again attributed incorrectly to a “lack of courage.”^[18] Through lobbying, veterans’ associations in post-World War One France managed to force changes in pension reform legislature, guaranteeing pensions in any laws made.^[19] Assisting the interconnected challenges between the government and those who had fought for France, progress in the form of the changes influenced by political efforts resulted in a “disability table” established by the minister or war in cooperation with civilian and military medical experts in order to provide consistency in disability evaluations.^[20] However, typical of all bureaucracies, the rate of change proved to be difficult for those awaiting determinations for discharge and the issuing of pensions. As a result, informal support and assistance groups amongst hospital-bound veterans began to provide relief to those in need.^[21]

Cooperation with other nations for shell shock took the form of joint research between American, British, and French doctors, once the issue began to be taken seriously within the psychological community. Efforts taken place during the war were complicated British internal medical community changes, the logistic challenges faced with transportation, and the availability of psychologists remaining, as most had left staff positions for the front.^[22] Another unfortunate result of the prolonged financial troubles faced with waging the war, the British Parliament began to slowly taper off cost of living increases in veterans’ pensions, forcing the wives of those mentally wounded in service to the Empire to seek additional employment in addition to providing care for their husbands.^[23]

Meaning

The mistakes made in relation to the psychological wounds of the First World War were brutal, reprehensible, and lingering for many countries involved in the conflict. While some nations – France and Portugal, specifically, – passed laws guaranteeing the “explicit right to reparation” in a legally binding manner, Britain’s obligation to veterans proved to be insufficient for basic needs without additional public assistance.^[24] Even for countries like Australia and New Zealand, the benefit of the vast experience and perspective of returning medical personnel failed to provide a clear policy change required of military leadership to properly incorporate these lessons to better prepare for the Second World War. Instead, the silent suffering of the veterans of the First World War and the mismanagement of bureaucracy failed to reveal the true nature of warfare in its effects on those who survived. Thus, the myth of the noble virtues of warfare, while tarnished, persisted with the next generation of young men destined to fight once again in Europe. Ironically, this legacy of warfare continues to live on in the minds of men and women today, despite the availability of the stories, examples, and knowledge of what waits on the battlefield. It could be suggested, then, that the myth of the glory of warfare is as unrelenting as the reality it creates, forming a relationship of interdependent value to the spirit and indefatigability of the human psyche.

Regardless of the causes and the politicized issue of veterans’ mental health, the issues from a century ago are still as critical as they remain today. However, as a result of the unimaginable mental trauma experienced by so many during the First World War, much progress has been made in the identification, treatment, and prevention of what we now understand as “post-traumatic stress disorder”. Yet the testimony of the motivation and resiliency of fighting men is universal, and best summarized by Reid:

Yet we can say that most mentally broken men wanted their injuries to be seen as honourable war wounds and they wanted effective treatment; they did not want to be seen as the tragic victims of a hapless war.^[25]

Independent of advances in the means with which man continually creates for the sake of protection, defense, or aggression, the romanticism of warfare, once cast aside, will never suffice for the realities and brutal honesty of the effects of war.

Notes:

[1] Dan Carlin, “Blueprint for Armageddon II,” Show 51, Hardcore History, January 30, 2014, accessed February 19, 2016, http://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-51-blueprint-for-armageddon-ii/, 26:22.

[2] Wyatt Bonikowski, Shell Shock and the Modernist Imagination, (Farnham, GB: Ashgate, 2013), accessed on February 19, 2016, http://nq.oxfordjournals.org/content/61/4/624.short?rss=1 , 58.

[3] Bradley W. Corfman, The Cost of Ignorance: Shell-Shock in Britain during World War I, Scholarworks.bgsu.edu, 2016, accessed February 19 2016, http://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=honorsprojects, 3.

[4] Mark David Sheftall, Altered Memories of the Great War, (London, US: I.B.Tauris, 2010), accessed on February 19, 2016. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/apus/reader.action?docID=10424523,  30.

[5] Ibid., 31.

[6] R. Rae, “An historical account of shell shock during the First World War and reforms in mental health in Australia 1914-1939,” International Journal of Mental Health Nursing 16, no. 4, (August 2007): 266-273 8p, CINAHL Complete, EBSCOhost, accessed January 30, 2016, http://yw6vq3kb9d.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=An+historical+account+of+shell+shock+during+the+First+World+War+and+reforms+in+mental+health+in+Australia+1914-1939&rft.jtitle=International+Journal+of+Mental+Health+Nursing&rft.au=Rae%2C+R&rft.date=2007&rft.issn=1445-8330&rft.eissn=1447-0349&rft.volume=16&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=266&rft.externalDBID=AMI&rft.externalDocID=An_historical_accoun87092355&paramdict=en-US, 267.

[7] Sheftall, Altered Memories of the Great War, 10.

[8] History.com Staff, “September 29, 1918: Allied Forces Break Through The Hindenburg Line,” History.com, (2009), accessed on February 18, 2016, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/allied-forces-break-through-the-hindenburg-line/print,

[9] Alex Watson, “Self-deception and Survival: Mental Coping Strategies on the Western Front, 1914-18,” 251.

[10] Fiona Reid, Broken Men, 67.

[11] Ibid., 42.

[12] Ibid., 69.

[13] Bonikowski, Shell Shock and the Modernist Imagination, 19.

[14] Corfman, The Cost of Ignorance: Shell-Shock in Britain during World War I ,11.

[15] Reid, 57.

[16] Reid, 110.

[17] Corfman, 2.

[18] Rae, R. “An historical account of shell shock during the First World War and reforms in mental health in Australia 1914-1939.” 272.

[19] Gregory M. Thomas, Treating the Trauma of the Great War: Soldiers, Civilians, and Psychiatry in France, 1914-1940, (Baton Rouge, LA, USA: Louisiana State University Press, 2009), accessed February 19, 2016, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/apus/reader.action?docID=10333740, 110.

[20] Gregory M. Thomas, Treating the Trauma of the Great War: Soldiers, Civilians, and Psychiatry in France, 1914-1940,105.

[21] Ibid., 109.

[22] Reid, 35.

[23] Thomas, 133.

[24] Ibid., 111.

[25] Reid, 34.