American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia – Key Information and Trends: 1970-1973

December 31, 1973

The momentum of political and social pressures described in previous Presidential Briefing Papers has continued to gather more anti-war sentiment amongst people and politicians alike. The events at Kent State University in Ohio and Jackson State College in Mississippi resulted in the deaths of six students in a confrontation with National Guardsmen tasked to provide order during the anti-war protests in May 1970.

Afterwards, in an attempt to stem the growing outrage at the continuation and expansion of the Vietnam War as well as to address the reactionary anger of the violence on American college campuses, over 350 academic institutions went on strike with an additional 500 closed to prevent further bloodshed.^[1] In terms of politically damning and dangerous examples of outrage, the increased attention Vietnam veterans have been gaining in public attention is places like Detroit and Washington D.C. have been calling to attention first-hand experiences of unfavorable activities by American troops in Vietnam against combatants and noncombatants in the course of the conflict. These small and medium scale events have become more frequent in occurrence and intensity – especially in the Washington D.C. – causing disorder and unfavorable press as their actions and questions pose a direct challenge for the cities and policymakers.^[2]

In Washington, the infighting and animosity between the three branches of the government has done little to stabilize the current situation at home or abroad and offers little in the way of optimism in determining the best course and policy to take for the U.S. With efforts to discredit and expose those critical of American foreign policy, the fabric of the rights and protections of the Constitution comes into direct question in regards to the best manner in which to address opposition. With official fears of an organized effort to undermine the current Administration, suspicions are currently cast at the Brookings Institution and Watergate, though direct evidence supporting the importance and relevance of these two locations have yet to be determined.^[3]

The opportunities for a peace between North and South Vietnam similar to that which currently exists on the Korean peninsula have faded fast as our involvement in Vietnam and neighboring countries has dragged on. As Saigon relinquished regional control to local militia in March, 1970, the government embarked on determined efforts to improve the agricultural prospects, infrastructure, and civil services for South Vietnam.^[4] The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) rose to the challenges posed by the gradual withdrawal of American forces with satisfactory improvement in training and operational ability.^[5] Combined with the defensive posture of the North Vietnamese forces since 1969, and the diplomatic efforts of 1971, all indications pointed towards the possibility for peace talks to be successful.^[6] However, the North Vietnamese offensives which started on March 30, 1972 proved that Hanoi was merely recuperating and preparing for operations intended to influence the U.S. Presidential campaigns as well as become political leverage in dictating the terms of any cessation of hostilities. Though American intelligence failed to predict this offensive move, the immediate American bombing campaign of North Vietnamese logistics areas and the combined mining and blocking of the port of Haiphong dampened North Vietnamese aggression and created diplomatic tension between Hanoi and Moscow.^[7]

In February, 1971, the expansion of American operations into Laos was marked by Lam Son 719, which was intended to delay any critical assessment of the possible failures of “Vietnamization.” With ARVN troops supported by U.S. airpower, the efforts in Laos were inconclusive in terms of victory – North Vietnamese logistics support was effectively disrupted, but the violation of the border provided Hanoi the opportunity to strike decisively at the allied troops with a significant force.^[8] American intervention in Cambodia began in March, 1970, with the suspicions of U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Cambodia’s neutral Prince Sihanouk and the rise of pro-American Prime Minister Lon Nol. These internal Cambodian problems pose the threat of further destabilization of the country with the potential for factions such as the Khmer Rouge to rise to power, threatening not only the integrity of the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia, but the safety and security of the Cambodian people.^[9]

Analysis

Since 1970, the direction American foreign policy in Vietnam has been one of repeated trial-and-failure as well as diplomacy through attrition. Between 1970 and 1973, approximately 9,414 American service members died in support of the ongoing actions in Vietnam, a declining figure since 1968.[10] Despite this, the continued presence of American forces in Vietnam will maintain a direct challenge to the leadership in Hanoi and suggest a permanent cycle of past U.S. actions. Consequently, any extension or prolongment in Vietnam will inevitably result in significant domestic political pressure to end our current involvement in the region. The displeasure of the American people with our history of actions in Southeast Asia has also reached somewhat of a breaking point, with recent polls indicating 71% of Americans feel the initial deployment of troops to Vietnam was wrong with Presidential ratings as low as 31%.^[11] Further political efforts must take three distinct approaches in order to begin the process of regaining the domestic and international confidence in American foreign policy. First, political concessions must be reached quickly to present a unified effort of the American government. Secondly, reassurances to the American people must be made and acted upon to restore order and support for future actions within and exclusive of our borders. Lastly, the welfare of veterans of the Vietnam war must be a prime consideration in follow-on recognition and services provided. As a potentially powerful entity, the former service members who have provided either voluntary or involuntary service to this country must be taken into consideration, and as the historic custodians of their fates, the American government owes their voices for their sacrifices.

Notes:

[1] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2002), accessed March 15, 2017, 293.

[2] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 298.

[3] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 300.

[4] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 285.

[5] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 285.

[6] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 303.

[7] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 304, 308.

[8] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 297.

[9] David L. Anderson, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, (Columbia University Press, 2010), accessed February 16, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central, 217.

[10] “Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War,” archives.gov, 2017, accessed March 15, 2017, https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html#page-header.

[11] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 300.