American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia – Key Information and Trends: 1962-1969

December 31, 1969

The continuing escalation of American involvement in Vietnam is presently starting to generate influence within American politics and societal issues, while domestic and international crises have dictated and defined the focus of U.S. attention and efforts since January 1, 1962. During his time in office, President Kennedy increased troops levels from 700 in January 1961 to 16,000 by November of 1963 – with this being concurrent with the inaction taken by his administration during the Vietnamese coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem.[1] Along with the ancillary friction between the West and the Soviets with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, these actions failed to gain international support for the conflict in Vietnam.[2] Following Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, Lyndon Johnson became the next president; it was his administration which immediately failed to act on the ample intelligence provided which indicated the poor state of the military situation in South Vietnam in 1964.[3] Options presented as early as 1963 by Robert McNamara were dismal, but accurate – leave, South Vietnam, maintain the status quo for the sole purpose of losing a war of attrition or increase troop strengths with the understanding that more troops would be needed within the year.[4] Further warnings provided by American military leadership and France foretold of the challenges that would be faced by fighting unconventional enemies in the difficult terrain of Vietnam’s jungles and mountains.[5] The Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 provided President Johnson the political justification to escalate American efforts and involvement in Vietnam; shortly after the passage of legislation granting approval to defend American regional assets, he authorized retaliatory bombing of North Vietnamese targets.[6] President Johnson also established a multi-step program to counter the encroachment of North Vietnamese influence, however these actions not only failed to stem the rural support and sympathies for the Communist Vietcong, but provided easier targets for attacks and attempts at political subversion.[7]

The first U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang in 1965 and were secretly authorized to conduct offensive operations against North Vietnamese troops.[8] However, the political instability following the overthrow of the Diem regime further hampered any consolidated resistance due to the political infighting in the South Vietnamese government and further emboldened North Vietnamese efforts to capitalize on the weak leadership provided by Saigon.[9] American diplomats with experience in Vietnam offered contradicting information about the overall predictions of American success in Vietnam; prior to 1965, the recommendations heeded favored reinforcement and progressive commitment of American troops to the growing war and discouraged attempts at negotiations with the North Vietnamese.[10] Proposals from the Johnson administration included the promise of economic and social assistance and reform estimated to be worth $1 billion. However, Johnson’s rhetoric reemphasizing American determination and commitment to an independent South Vietnam was deemed belligerent to the government in Hanoi as well as China.[11] Division over the ongoing war in Vietnam fractured the Democratic party prior to the 1968 Presidential election, and the war’s mounting financial burden became a threat to the global economy. With the assassination of several key American political and activist figures during the 1960s, the political and social turmoil in the U.S. was further hindered by anti-war protests and race riots in several major American cities.[12] The Tet Offensive of January 1968 took American and South Vietnamese defenders by surprise and became a major turning point in the war, with American public opinion further swayed against further involvement in the Vietnam War.[13] The bombing of the sections of the North Vietnamese logistics trails in Cambodia by President Nixon in the beginning of 1969 was an attempt to show North Vietnamese leadership that the U.S. was willing and able to violate Cambodia’s neutrality in order to escalate the war to the point where Hanoi would be more responsive to peace talks initiated by the U.S.[14]

Analysis

Since 1962, American commitment to Vietnam has indicated that the progressive increase in troop numbers – which started at 9,000 and is now approximately 475,200 service members – has failed to either stabilize South Vietnam or dissuade North Vietnamese influence.[15] As more ground forces have been committed, the numbers of American deaths in this contested region have also increased – from 31 in 1962 to 9,414. 1968, the year of our increased offensive actions and the Tet Offensive, resulted in the most service members killed in action during this seven-year period: 14,589.[16] These numbers, in retrospect, constitute the reality of the consistent selectiveness which various administrations and the results of favoring only the most optimistic of those assessments. The elimination of unpopular political leadership in South Vietnam closely reflects the growing division within our own government over the continued participation in and execution of the conflict in Vietnam. Public opinion in both nations has indicated that this war is unpopular, despite diplomatic efforts and offers to rebuild and restore the economic and humanitarian support of South Vietnam. Further escalations in offensive operations of manpower commitment in maintaining this conflict will result in even greater divides in American and South Vietnamese diplomacy, social order, and international opinion. As the credibility of both governments is in question by the people of these nations and the international community, it is imperative that every effort be exerted to enter into negotiations which prevent further loss of life and guarantees the independence of South Vietnam. While evidence has indicated Hanoi’s resistance to acknowledge and accept South Vietnam as anything other than a potential adversary, an internationally-sanctioned and supported Armistice similar to the tenuous peace between North and South Korea is not only possible, but necessary at this point in the conflict.

Notes:

[1] David L. Anderson, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, (Columbia University Press, 2010), accessed March 4, 2017, ProQuest Ebook Central, 143-144.

[2] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2002), accessed March 4, 2017, 121

[3] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2002), accessed March 4, 2017, 155

[4] David L. Anderson, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War,159.

[5] Ibid., 148.

[6] Ibid., 144.

[7] Ibid., 145.

[8] George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 157.

[9] Anderson, 147.

[10] Ibid., 154.

[11] Ibid., 156.

[12] Ibid., 196.

[13] Ibid., 190.

[14] Ibid., 323.

[15] Herring, 182.