American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia – Key Information and Trends: 1945-1961

The next four posts are part of a series of academic assignments (“Presidential Briefing Papers”) for a class on the Vietnam War. As the current discussion of our present “flawed design” in Afghanistan continues, more and more parallels between these two conflicts requires an appreciation of the conflict in Southeast Asia to better understand how being too close to the problem – or history – can obscure simple truths.

December 31, 1961

The growing tension in Southeast Asia through December 1961 are the result of a series of seemingly unrelated domestic as well as international issues and policies which, as properly managed isolated factors, would have lessened the present strain between the U.S. and Vietnam. Within the United States, the discovery of Soviet espionage efforts following the conclusion of the Second World War has furthered the rift between the two nations. With the discovery and subsequent conviction of several employees associated with American atomic research in the late 1940s, the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency indicate the presence of active and persistent Soviet efforts to discern and influence American diplomatic efforts within the international community. As a handful of known and convicted Communist leaders have managed to escape custody and disappear within the U.S., the potential for these leaders to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the growing civic unrest due to increased racial tensions in major Southern metropolitan cities. These events and actions further distance the U.S. from any possibility for meaningful diplomatic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

In Europe, the reconstruction and realignment of the countries ravaged by the Second World War has led to many secondary and tertiary effects which have been felt globally. The absorption of many Eastern European nations under the influence and control of the Soviet Union has provided an example for other potential Communist revolutionaries to follow in the power vacuum left by the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. East Germany, Poland, and Hungary – occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war – proved to be territory which the Soviets indicated they would counter any Western interference or intervention with force, and the resulting adoption of “containment” by the U.S. and its allies was intended to check the further spread of Communist influence to other European nations. Though Stalin passed away in 1953, this event had little effect on the rise of other significant Communist nations or regional aspirations. China, established as the People’s Republic of China in 1949, provided another front for such containment as it lent support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their invasion of South Korea in 1950. In this action, a coalition European and American forces acting under the then-newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization became engaged in fighting in Asia under the concept that direct Communist aggression anywhere in the world would be met by NATO. Though the direct hostilities ended with a cautious truce in July 1953, the Korean War served as an example of European interests and involvement in contesting the direct and indirect actions of Communist influence in Asia.

France, contending with such revolutionary uprisings in its former colonies of Algeria and Indochina began to increase military effort in both locations in an attempt to restore order and control of these regions. Indochina, having undergone a Communist-led August Revolution in September 1945, declared independence from French control as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Led by Ho Chi Minh, a charismatic and complex Communist leader who is capable of shifting and adapting his internal and foreign policy rapidly according to the civic and national needs of the Vietnamese, Ho’s Vietminh forces present a substantial challenge for French political and military regional influences. With the first sign of direct combat being the fighting between Vietnimh and French forces in Haiphong and Hanoi in late 1946, it is clear that much of the resistance to the foreign control was presently located with the rebellious forces gathering support from the rural and mountainous areas with increased support to Ho’s faction coming from neighboring Communist China to the north. As French military efforts increased, to include aerial bombardment of villages suspected of collaborating with the Vietminh, the increased loss of civilian life lent further public support for the latter and established Ho as a national patriot.

Seeking to maintain positive relations with France, the support offered by the U.S. in Vietnam was initially modest and relatively noncommittal. In 1953, however, U.S. aid to the French forces fighting the Vietnimh increased financial support by 80% of the French costs of the combat. Late to offer enough aid to prevent the French loss at Dienbienphu in April 1954, President Truman declared his intent to prevent the subsequent and sequential fall of Asian nations to Communist aspirations and sought diplomatic recourses to prevent the further spread of Communist influence. Negotiating a cease-fire and temporary division of Vietnam into two separate nations – North and South Vietnam – the situation justified the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with South Vietnam falling under the protection of SEATO security. Due to lack of political conflict, the elections of 1956 failed to meet the intent of providing a political resolution advocating the reunification of Vietnam under a democratically chosen form of government, and with the threat of Communist influence spreading to neighboring Laos, the U.S. gradually increased military aid to South Vietnam as a firm response.

Failures in South Vietnamese leadership to remain objective and unbiased in regards to internal affairs suggested internal lack of political resolve and the creation and political encroachment of Communist organizations such as the National Liberation Front threatened to undermine and potentially overthrow the government of South Vietnam through subversive and indirect means. Gaining momentum by 1960, the NLF were referred to as “Vietcong” and generated concern within the South Vietnamese and American Governments. With diminishing faith in the leadership of South Vietnam and seeking to stem the renewed aggression of the Soviet Union’s influence following the American failure to counter the spread of Communist ideology in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs debacle in early 1961, the recent increase of U.S. Special Forces involvement and their antiguerrilla training of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was initially considered to be the appropriate course of action. However, this only proved to be an instigation and invitation to the Vietcong to increase their efforts in the south and as a result, North Vietnam has doubled their logistic support for their cause.

Analysis

American foreign policy in regard to Vietnam at this time must take into consideration several key factors. First, as evident in the reciprocal response by the Vietcong and North Vietnam to any increase in U.S. visibility and activity in the region, careful deliberation must be made prior to any increases made in 1962 along these lines. The potential for a gradual increase of military forces will inevitably draw a similar response from the North, and therefore increase the U.S. commitment in order to preserve our political gains in the region. The polar opposite course of action – to begin a gradual reduction in military presence – is also perilous route in that it would establish a precedent of resistance to Western influence and activity. Cautious, yet firm, diplomacy provides a safe “middle ground” to allow for the slow process of political influence to take the best route with the least irreversible commitment.

Domestic issues are also a key consideration in the ideal approach towards the issues in Vietnam. The discovery of Communist advocates and agents within the U.S. government and industry indicate a determined and deliberate attempt by the Soviet Union to infiltrate our borders over the last two decades. The number of known personnel discovered and prosecuted for espionage suggests the possibility that many more remain hidden. With the potential for such elements to find opportunity to increase sympathy and identity with Communist ideology within the growing civil unrest, any actions regarding Vietnam require public understanding and support to prevent any further internal dissent from growing and becoming politically significant during the next decade.