Posted 27Feb2018.
This was an extremely personal issue while I was on flight status as a UH-60 crewchief/flight instructor/standardization instructor.
Taking only the incidents which happened while I was on active duty as a 67T – later 15T – from 1996 through 2016 (from armyaircrews.com ):
“13Oct11… A/C (aircraft) was on a MEDEVAC mission in Kunar Province arriving at LZ at approx 2000 hrs. A/C was performing a two-wheel landing at an HLZ (helicopter landing zone) to allow MO to onboard 2 urgent patients. MO (medic) exited to get the third patient and was returning to A/C when he was struck by a M/R (main rotor) blade.”
“9Jun06… A/C made a precautionary landing at Outlaw Field after warning light came on during a routine maintenance mission. Soldier was killed by M/R blade strike after exiting A/C.”
“31Jan98…Pilot and CE (crewchief) performing MOC (maintenance operational check) on new fuel filter at Simmons AAF. At request of CE, pilot increases PCL (power control lever) to about 96%, causing gust-lock to break and blades start to turn. With blades being tied down, one bends and breaks, causing a severe out-of-balance condition that shakes the A/C apart.”
“27Feb96…A/C taxied into hot refuel at Simmons AAF and all PAX’s (passengers) exited. A mechanical fault undetected by the flight crew allowed the blades to drift forward and struck the Major in the head when he walked to the front of the A/C rather than to the side. MO was assigned to 3 SFG.”
Two other mishaps happened prior to 1996, but I will only speak on the above examples.
Helicopters are an extremely versatile asset to military and civilian operators in that they can land pretty much anywhere to offload passengers and cargo – from fixed airfields to pinnacles which only allow enough room to get one main landing gear tire touching the ground. This ability comes with a price of being at the mercy of the environment: not all landing zones (LZ’s) are agreeably flat. Coupled with the fact that I have personally seen situations where wind, pilot inattention, and rolling low terrain placed the path of the blade tips at about torso-level for the average soldier, caution around operating helicopters can not be stressed enough… even for aircrews, which covers all of the above fatalities.
Let that sink in: the above accidents resulted in the deaths of the crewmembers… not their passengers or ground support personnel (in the case of the Major in the ’96 accident, he was a flight surgeon).
Unfortunately included on this list was Bethany Stewart – a friend. We had gone through Basic and Advanced Individual Training (AIT) together, and she was second in class standing to myself. Smart… funny… and determined; I found out about her death the day I was pinned Specialist, and she was the first of many friends I have lost over the years to a line of work we chose to perform.
So… Back to the original question: “How do people get killed by helicopter blades if they sit up high?”
It really depends on a lot of different factors, but the environment, situational awareness, and confidence play key roles. In the case of the flight surgeon, the medic who was directing the other passengers to the marshaling area while they were in the forward arming and refueling point (FARP) momentarily lost sight of the Major. Perhaps it was the Major’s overconfidence around helicopters which led him to believe the nose of the Blackhawk was still a “safe” direction. With the designed 3̊ forward tilt of the main transmission, the gradual up slope of the FARP, and the pilots unintentionally pushing forward on the cyclic, these links of the chain culminated with the medic nearly within arms’ reach of the Major when the blades hit.
MEDEVAC missions in a combat zone also create perceptual tunneling – especially when there are multiple patients and assisting soldiers moving around with an almost chaotic sense of urgency. The same could be said about the 2006 incident – they had performed a precautionary landing and the typical egress plan in the crew mission brief involves “meeting 50 meters from the off the nose…” after exiting the aircraft.
As for the ground accident… Like the others, it was overconfidence and the desire to get the aircraft back to a mission-ready status. I have spoken with several folks involved in each of these accidents, and, having been in several near-mishaps myself, I honestly say that I could easily imagine myself being the subject of post-accident conjecture and analysis. I cannot place blame on one specific individual – aviation operations are never that simple.
(Point of interest: the aircraft in the picture as well as the one behind it – 96 26709 and 96 26710 – were involved in another accident in Hawaii on 12Feb01… another case of situational awareness and overconfidence.)
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