Soviet Shipping and American Subs – A Look at Fratricide

At times, Quora can be irritatingly problematic due to the inconsistent moderation of the discussions, but there are times when I enjoy the inspiration provided by some of the questions.

What do you know about WWII that I probably don’t?

Soviet merchant ships were accidentally engaged by American submarines during the war.

According to Clay Blair Jr’s Silent Victory, one such trawler was mistaken for a Japanese patrol craft and engaged by the USS Permit on July 9, 1943. Upon realizing the mistake, the skipper of the Permit rescued the survivors – a couple of men and several women – and was instructed to take them to Dutch Harbor, Alaska, rather than risk the internment of the sub and crew in a Soviet port. During transit to Dutch Harbor, the survivors were so well treated by the crew of the Permit that the women were reluctant to leave the boat upon arrival and the trawler captain reported that the Permit had actually saved his crew from an attack by a Japanese submarine.^[1]

The final tally of Soviet ships attacked by American submarines during the war was comparatively negligible – five in comparison to the 1,314 enemy ships sunk by U.S. subs – but the trend posed to be understandably problematic for U.S.-Soviet relations during the war.^[2]  In the beginning of 1943, the USS Sawfish was the first boat to fire upon Soviet shipping, but the facts of the engagement were only fully understood after the end of the patrol due to the official protest of the Soviet government. The Soviets, prompted to resolve the situation, “improved recognition markings and furnished more and better information on general traffic routing and individual ship movements,” but these measures still allowed for subsequent examples of fratricide.[3]

The rationale offered by the various skippers for these engagements vary due to the circumstances of their engagements, but reflected a recurring theme:

USS Sandlance (mid-1943): “It had not markings and was ‘not within the safe conduct lane’ given by the Russians.” ^[4]

USS Tambor (mid-1944): “I knew she was Russian but she didn’t have the proper markings.” ^[5]

USS Spadefish (June 1945): “The ship had no lights burning and ‘was not following a designated Russian route.’”^[6]

Thus, these events were both unfortunate and unavoidable due to fog of war and the nature of maritime interdiction in the challenging environment of the Sea of Japan.

The “improved recognition markings” poses somewhat of a challenge to present research, due to the wartime censorship efforts of the Soviet government. A quick search on the internet yields some information, however. Most of the warships of the Soviet Navy were quite distinguishable with the Soviet flag and naval ensign flying, like so:

(Source: https://forum.axishistory.com/vi…)

However, merchant shipping is not the same, visually, as merchant ships. A fair example of this would be the steamer Dalstroy:

(Source: The Unknown War in the Northern Pacific)

Interestingly enough, more Soviet merchant ships are listed on this site which expands on Blair’s research. This is part of the problem with quick posts using one source – there will be discrepancies based on the date of publication and the availability of information from the bureaucratic bowels of various government archives.

Before I get too far off on that tangent, though, I couldn’t help but notice the huge “USSR” logo amidships on the Dalstroy and can only wonder if this is an example of the “improved recognition markings” adopted by the Soviets. Common sense would say “Uh, yeah?” but this would have to be researched a bit more, as common sense and history never seem to mesh well.

It is understandable the confusion experienced during these engagements was typically compounded by poor visibility and structural similarity to enemy shipping. Whether or not the presence of flags, ensigns, or obvious markings would have influenced events is questionable, but it is clear from Blair’s research that several Soviet ships were properly identified and permitted safe passage on a frequent basis….

[1] Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975), 439-440.

[2] Ibid., 539.

[3] Ibid., 378.

[4] Ibid., 566.

[5] Ibid., 671

[6] Ibid., 839.