The Crimean War, the American Civil War… Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan

I have considered revising some of my academic submissions into long-form posts here, but in the meantime (and consistent with my recent post), I am going to leave this as largely as it was saved – with the question or comments in italics.

Of course, feedback – especially on readability – will always be appreciated.

Looking at the campaigns in the Crimean War and the American Civil War, why do many modern military historians believe that martial technologies outpaced military tactics? In the aftermath of the American Civil War, which of the prominent European military theorists, Jomini or Clausewitz, held more weight in strategic thinking moving forward into the nineteenth century? Why?

To first answer the questions posed, the context of technological advancements of warfare in the 1800’s needs to be clarified. With the advent of reliable percussion caps in the first half of the 19^th century, the basic weapon of land forces saw a leap in lethality and overall effectiveness in firepower.[1] Similarly, the use of cavalry had been progressively negated by such advances and the reliance on their use in the orthodox applications resulted in such well-documented failures like the Battle of Balaclava in 1854, where the ill-fated charge of the British Light Brigade became immortalized in Tennyson’s poem depicting their actions and defeat at the hands of the defending Russian artillery.[2]

In the case of both the Crimean War and the American Civil War, military theorists such as Jomini held more weight in strategic thinking for the simple fact of preferential inclusion of his theories in their formal military education. Though Clausewitz implied that theory is a tool and not a doctrine to be strictly adhered to, many military historians emphasize the aspect of Jomini’s writings were learned, but missed the point in being able to effectively implement the spirit of his words.[3] In both conflicts, Jomini’s influence can be viewed, in hindsight, in clarity with the emphasis on offense, massed strength, and localized combat which was contrary to the idea of “total war” offered by Clausewitz.[4] However, it should be noted that a definitive preference of one theorist over the other is a reckless statement in that absolutes in warfare or strategy are only limited to the casualties suffered by all.

Modern military historians view that the contemporary innovations in warfare progressed at a much faster rate than the tactics which were part of the doctrines at the time simply because of the glacial rate in which lessons learned in the conflicts which saw the debut of innovative technology were incorporated into the formal military education system. This is an unfortunate trend which is not isolated to the past, but remains ongoing into present day assessment of threats, capabilities, and intentions and is stressed by the overall desirability of “predictability” in doctrine, policy, and force.[5]

“Can you research and discuss the origin, course, and strategic outcome of the Crimean War? In what ways did this war in the 1850s presage the American Civil War in the 1860s?”

In getting mired in the abundance of detail and observations from the Crimean War, the simplified answer would be: economics and institutions caused the war, attrition and innovation sustained the war, and opinions and concessions ended the conflict.

Russian territorial expansion conflicted with the economic might of the British empire and the evolution of Russia’s industry posed to threaten British exports to the Black Sea region.[6] The institution of faith also played a vital role in generating friction between the Turks who controlled access to Palestine and the Holy Places there and the Orthodox pilgrims from Russia who visited as well as the French President of the Second Republic who viewed unrestricted control as effective political leverage to use for his own purposes.[7] The Crimean War turned into a battle of attrition for all involved participants and with the campaign in places like Sevastopol slowly turning public opinion sour in Britain, the shifting and strained alliances were unable to effectively maintain validity in similar continued actions.[8] Innovations such as battleships,[9] logistics, artillery, and rail transport[10] provided a balance to the disadvantages sustained by the distances Allied forces had to transit to the contended areas. Finally, opinion in the British press remained firmly committed to the continuation of warfare against the Russians, though the prospect of a cessation of hostilities gained momentum within Allied leadership.[11] The concessions which were finally agreed upon at the Treaty of Paris in 1856 returned many of the lands gained by Russia during the war to their pre-war owners, limited the ability for Russia to maintain a fleet of the Black Sea, and clarified the access to the Holy Lands under Turkish control; however, in the process of the international realigning of power, eventually undermined the cooperation of many European nations in accordance with the Vienna Settlement and resulted in the reforms of Russian military and industrial efforts.^[12]

Much like the American Civil War, which followed less than a decade later, many of these same factors played a key role in the origins, execution, and resolution of the conflict. Economic disparity of the North, adherence to the institution of slavery in the South, attrition of the Confederate manpower, military innovation in firearms, and the swaying of public opinion as to the prospect of Southern victory resulted in their defeat and resulting Reconstruction in a reflection of the lessons not heeded by the Crimean War.

“If they had focused on creating more of those instead of muskets, the average regiment could have fired multiple volleys before the enemy was within range.”

I think that one of the biggest aspects overlooked in academic research and discussion of these battles is the psychological impact it had to have on the soldiers fighting. I am addicted to collecting various PDF’s on a wide variety of topics from lessons not learned in Afghanistan to the historic analysis of winter operations in Russia during the Second World War, and it took less than a minute to bring up one document discussing psychiatric lessons of combat. In the conclusion, one of the potential means to prevent stress from overcoming combatants is to take into account the benefits of cohesion via leadership, training, and shared stress.[13] In my discussions with soldiers at a very early stage of their careers, the topic of whether or not they would be able to take another life has been broached by these young folks and my response invariably touches on this exact point: cohesion. I knew I was just as afraid as anyone else to end up hurt in the back of someone else’s Medevac bird, but I was more afraid that my inaction or indecision would result in a similar fate for one of my guys – whether it be my crew or our passengers. Would I be “freaked out” in experiencing the combat that those of infantry formations of a century ago routinely did? Sure, but I think my answer would still be the same, once I became part of their cohesive unit.

“To that end Mahan saw naval power as the only way that the United States could both grow and defend its burgeoning overseas commerce.”

Through this class, I have been introduced to the writings of Julian Corbett and I have found that the theories by both Corbett and Mahan are in the process of being grossly overlooked with the slow whittling-down of our Navy. While our current “threat” – Russia, predominately – possesses only a fraction of our surface combatants, the state of our own merchant fleet has declined sharply over the last 51 years. Currently, we only possess 108 freighters to 2,138 in 1965, and our most vital asset – tankers – has gone from 422 to a mere 53.[14] These numbers may not mean much to the average person, but when it comes to the maritime logistic support for any land combat, these numbers are appalling and disconcerting for those charged with maintaining a viable national foreign policy. One of my most read (thus, most replaced) books is Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising and the scenario he described in this book emphasizes something that we knew during our submarine campaign in the Pacific during World War Two, yet seem to have forgotten in our present day of instant gratification. That lesson of the fragility of ocean-going logistics is one that we cannot afford to repeat with the current state of maritime transport.

 

[1] Jeremy Black, Western Warfare, 1775-1882, (Durham, US: Routledge, 2014), accessed October 27, 2016, ProQuest ebrary, 121.

[2] Ibid., 125.

[3] Donald Stoker, Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War, (Cary, GB: Oxford University Press, 2010), accessed October 26, 2016, ProQuest ebrary, 412.

[4] Gabor S. Boritt, Why the Confederacy Lost. (Cary, GB: Oxford University Press, 1992), accessed October 26, 2016, ProQuest ebrary, 86.

[5] Jerry Hendrix, “How Russia and China are Using America’s Predictability as a Weapon,” The National Interest, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-russia-china-are-using-americas-predictability-weapon-17956, 1.

[6] Andrew Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853–56, (Farnham, GB: Routledge, 2011), accessed October 30, 2016, ProQuest ebrary, 39.

[7] Ibid., 45.

[8] Ibid., 347.

[9] Ibid., 350.

[10] Ibid., 351.

[11] Ibid., 335.

[12] Andrew Lambert, “The Crimean War,” bbc.co.uk, 2011, accessed October 30, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/crimea_01.shtml.

[13] Franklin Jones, “War Psychiatry,” Fas.Org, 1989, accessed on October 30, 2016, http://fas.org/irp/doddir/milmed/warpsychiatry.pdf, 28.

[14] “Table 1-24: Number and Size of the U.S. Flag Merchant Fleet and its Share of the World Fleet,” Rita.Dot.Gov, 2016, accessed October 30, 2016, https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_24.html_mfd.

Bibliography

Black, Jeremy. Western Warfare, 1775-1882. Durham, US: Routledge, 2014. Accessed October 27, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

Boritt, Gabor S. Why the Confederacy Lost. Cary, GB: Oxford University Press, USA, 1992. Accessed October 26, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

Hendrix, Jerry. “How Russia and China are Using America’s Predictability as a Weapon.” The National Interest. 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-russia-china-are-using-americas-predictability-weapon-17956.

Jones, Franklin. “War Psychiatry.” fas.org. 1989. Accessed on October 30, 2016. http://fas.org/irp/doddir/milmed/warpsychiatry.pdf.

Lambert, Andrew. “The Crimean War.” bbc.co.uk. 2011. Accessed October 30, 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/crimea_01.shtml.

Lambert, Andrew. The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853–56. Farnham, GB: Routledge, 2011. Accessed October 30, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

Stoker, Donald. Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War. Cary, GB: Oxford University Press, 2010. Accessed October 26, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

“Table 1-24: Number and Size of the U.S. Flag Merchant Fleet and its Share of the World Fleet.” Rita.Dot.Gov. 2016. Accessed October 30, 2016. https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_24.html_mfd.